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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 10, 2006 British intelligence prevented a terrorist plot to
blow up ten airplanes by detonating common liquids.' In response, the
Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") banned certain carry-on
items. 2 In May 2007 TSA unveiled "FIDO," a hand-held scanner capa-
* Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. The author presented
aspects of this article at the 46th Annual Transportation Research Forum at George Washington
University as chair of a panel featuring representatives of the Transportation Security
Administration, Heritage Foundation, Electronic Privacy Information Center, and American Civil
Liberties Union. Thanks to Dr. Richard W. Bloom, Dean, College of Arts and Sciences and
Director, Terrorism, Intelligence, and Security Studies, and Gregory A. Popp, Director, Center for
Professional Education & Legal Affairs, both of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, for their
invaluable comments on earlier versions of this article. The views expressed herein are solely
those of the author, who welcomes comments at ravicht@bellsouth.net.
1. Agent Infiltrated Terror Cell, U.S. Says, CNN.coM, Aug. 11, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/
2006/US/08/10/US.security/index.html.
2. See John M. Doyle, Bomb Plot Fallout, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 2, 2006, at
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ble of detecting liquid explosives inside sealed bottles.' Although pro-
viding an important layer of security, carry-on restrictions and
explosives detecting equipment exemplify why profiling is necessary to
safeguard commercial aviation. Reaction-based national aviation secur-
ity policy focused myopically on objects instead of people is backward
looking and flawed, "the equivalent of fighting the last war."4
Profiling airline passengers should be a vital part of commercial
aviation security because screening for bad people is at least as impor-
tant as screening for bad things. This article explores the theoretical
underpinnings of government- and private-sector profiling systems like
"CAPPS," "CAPPS II," and "Secure Flight," along with the "Registered
Traveler" program, and examines whether such systems represent effec-
tive anti-terrorism measures designed to manage the risk against future
airline terrorism.5 In doing so, this article does not accept the ongoing
development of profiling systems uncritically.
98 ("[As of August 10, 2006] passengers can now carry on small containers-3-oz. or less-of
shampoo, toothpaste, skin creams, and similar items-if they all fit into a zippered, one-quart,
clear plastic bag ...."). For a detailed list of permitted and prohibited carry-on items, see
TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., PREPARE FOR TAKEOFF: PERMITTED AND PROHIBITED ITEMS, available at
http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/Prohibited%20and%2OPermitted%201tems-printerfriendly-3-16-
07.pdf.
3. See Peter J. Howe, Logan Tests Device That Sniffs Out Explosive Liquids: Scanners
Won't End Need for Carry-on Rules but Will Make Skies Safer, TSA Says, BOSTON GLOBE, May
25, 2007, at IC. In 1987 and 1994, terrorists detonated liquids, including nitroglycerin in contact
lens solution bottles, on international airplanes. See Jessica Ruvinsky & Kyla Dunn, The Truth
About Liquid Bombs: Promising New Technologies Could Sniff Out Liquid Bombs. But Can Their
Limitations Be Overcome?, DISCOVER, Nov. 1, 2006, at 50.
4. Shaun Waterman & Jessica Taylor, Analysis: TSA Liquid Ban To Continue, UNITED PRESS
INT'L., Aug. 14, 2006, http://www.upi.com/Security-Terrorism/Analysis/2006/08/14/analysis-tsa
_liquid ban to continue/5694 (discussing the need for developments in screening technology that
go beyond merely scanning for metal objects); see also How Did Hijackers Get Past Airport
Security?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, at Al ("For three decades, [aviation security] has been
preoccupied with looking for guns and explosives rather than for dangerous people. . . . U.S.
Security efforts aim to catch the bomb; El Al's is to catch the bomber.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
5. One source identifies three classes of profiling: biometric, psychometric, and sociometric.
Biometric, Psychometric, and Sociometric Profiling, IBPPoNLINE, Oct. 24, 2003, http://security.
pr.erau.edu/read.php?kind=html&articlevolume= 15&articleissue=8&article title=Biometric%
2C%20Psychometric%2C%20and%20Sociometric%2OProfiling. "In biometric profiling, the
information leading to behavioral prediction comprises human physical characteristics ... [like]
the iris, finger pads, structural and kinesic elements of the face, and partially overlapping
physiological phenomena that can be detected remotely. Sweating, pulse rate, and respiration are
examples of common psychophysiological phenomena." Id. Psychometric profiling involves
"inferred traits as to human cognition, emotion, motivation, and behavioral tendencies, as well as
a plethora of observed traits further describing certain behaviors such as speaking and walking."
Id. Finally, "[i]n sociometric profiling, the information leading to behavioral prediction comprises
interpersonal, intragroup, intraorganizational, and intracultural aspects of an individual's
biological, psychological, and social functioning--e.g., academic and work history, criminal
record, degree and type of cooperation and competition with other individuals, participation in
informal networks, and ethnic identification." Id.
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As a threshold matter, whether profiling systems can reliably pre-
dict who is or is likely to become a terrorist is questionable. Terrorists
come from every background, and age, sex, ethnicity, education, and
economic status are becoming irrelevant considerations for profiling
purposes.6 For example, three of the suspects arrested in the August
2006 liquid-bomb plot were religious converts from London's affluent
suburbs, including one man who was the son of an English Conservative
Party activist and who loved the movie Team America.7 Practically,
then, identifying terrorists through profiling may be impossible, not
merely counterintuitive.
Legally, too, airline passenger profiling raises important constitu-
tional considerations that should not be dismissed simply because more
security is needed at the nation's airports. Liberty and privacy are chief
among these considerations. Liberty, like life and the pursuit of happi-
ness, is one of the specific unalienable rights expressed in the Declara-
tion of Independence.' Liberty, in turn, involves privacy or the "right
'to be let alone.' "" Liberty and privacy are abstractions, encompassing
many definitions and evading certain meaning simultaneously.' ° None-
6. See MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS 99 (2004); see also Richard
W. Bloom, Commentary on the Motivational Psychology of Terrorism Against Transportation
Systems: Implications for Airline Safety and Transportation Law, 25 TRANSP. L.J. 175, 179 (1998)
("[M]ost profilers analyze external features, such as physical characteristics, behaviors, or
demographics. However, intrapsychic processes may be more robust correlates of terrorist
behavior, but are more difficult to identify. Yet, some psychologists even believe that these
correlates either do not exist or are irrelevant in analyzing human behavior."); Craig Whitlock,
Terrorists Proving Harder To Profile: European Officials Say Traits of Suspected Islamic
Extremists Are Constantly Shifting, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2007, at Al ("With new plots surfacing
every month, police across Europe are arresting significant numbers of women, teenagers, white-
skinned suspects and people baptized as Christians-groups that in the past were considered
among the least likely to embrace Islamic radicalism.").
7. Whitlock, supra note 6, at A l. That no reliable profile of a terrorist may exist was further
illustrated by the fact that investigators of the August 2006 liquid-bomb plot suspected that a
husband and wife planned to smuggle liquid explosives aboard airplanes using their infant
daughter's bottle. Id. Another more recent example of terrorism by people considered to be
caregivers occurred on June 30, 2007 when several physicians put into action a plot to drive a
suicide car bomb into the arrival terminal at the airport in Glasgow, Scotland. See Olga Craig,
The People Who Cure You Will Kill You, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), July 8, 2007, at 20; Aditi
Khanna et al., Doctors of Terror, INDIA TODAY, July 16, 2007, at 40.
8. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
9. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195
(1890) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)); see
also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (referring to
privacy as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men"),
overruled by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); Ayn Rand, The Soul of an Individualist, in THE FOUNTAINHEAD (1943), reprinted in FOR
THE NEW INTELLECTUAL: THE PHILOSOPHY OF AYN RAND, at 98 (Random House 1961)
("Civilization is the progress toward a society of privacy.").
10. The definition of terrorism is complicated and evolving. See, e.g., CONOR GEARTY, THE
FUTURE OF TERRORISM (1997); BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM I (rev. & expanded ed.
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theless, Americans demand certainty after September 11, 2001, espe-
cially in regard to commercial aviation security. Historically, though,
abstractions such as civil liberties have suffered in times of indefinite-
ness and national security crises and, presently, the invitation for avia-
tion security policy makers to restrict liberty and privacy in reaction to
terrorist threats is attractive.11 Designing and implementing effective
airline passenger profiling systems need not present liberty and privacy,
on one hand, and national security, on the other hand, as mutually exclu-
sive policy choices. 12
Privacy, liberty, and security proponents are equally blameworthy
in presenting their arguments for or against airline passenger profiling
2006); JAY M. SHAFRITZ ET AL., ALMANAC OF MODERN TERRORISM 263-65 (1991); R.I.R.
Abeyratne, The Effects of Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation on World Peace and the
Social Order, 22 TRANsP. L.J. 449, 451-56 (1995); R.R. Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept
of Terrorism, 7 AKRON L. REV. 380, 380 (1974); Christopher L. Blakesley, Ruminations on
Terrorism & Anti-Terrorism Law & Literature, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1042-62 (2003); John
Dugard, International Terrorism: Problems of Definition, 50 INT'L AFF. 67, 67 (1974); Thomas
M. Franck & Scott C. Senecal, Porfiry's Proposition: Legitimacy and Terrorism, 20 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 195, 202 (1987); Geoffrey Levitt, Is "Terrorism" Worth Defining?, 13 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 97, 97 (1986); Michael P. Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peace Time Equivalent of
War Crimes: A Case of Too Much Convergence Between International Humanitarian Law and
International Criminal Law?, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 391, 391 (2001); see also Stethem v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F. Supp. 2d 78, 89 (D.D.C. 2002) ("All acts of terrorism are by their
very definition extreme and outrageous and intended to cause the highest degree of emotional
distress, literally, terror, in their targeted audience: The more extreme and outrageous, the greater
the resulting distress.").
11. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
(1998); THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (Richard C.
Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003); Joseph Kubler, U.S. Citizens as Enemy Combatants;
Indication of a Roll-back of Civil Liberties or a Sign of Our Jurisprudential Evolution?, 18 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 631, 674 (2004); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 605-06 (2003); Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil
Liberties in Wartime, 28 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 215, 215 (2003); Daniel W. Sutherland, Homeland
Security and Civil Liberties: Protecting America's Way of Life, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 289, 302 (2005); Diane P. Wood, The Rule of Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 455, 455 (2003); John Yoo, Essay, The Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Constitution,
14 GEo. MASON L. REv. 565 (2007); Richard A. Posner, Security Versus Civil Liberties,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2001, at 46, 46; see also Frank Cerabino, Hard-Won Freedoms Easily
Lost, Groups Say, PALM BEACH POST, Sept. 30, 2001, at IA ("The fear and uncertainty of living
among terrorists has made many Americans think that maybe Big Brother should be bigger-not
smaller-and that hard-fought constitutional rights are negotiable in tough times.").
12. Compare K. A. Taipale, Technology, Security and Privacy: The Fear of Frankenstein, the
Mythology of Privacy and the Lessons of King Ludd, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 123, 127 (2004-2005)
("Security and privacy are not a balancing act but rather dual obligations of a liberal democracy
that present a wicked problem for policy makers.") (emphasis in original), with Darren W. Davis
& Brian D. Silver, Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist
Attacks on America, 48 AM. J. POL. ScI. 28, 29 (2004) ("America's response to the terrorist
attacks [of September 11, 2001] reveals a 'contestability of rights' in which the commitment to
civil liberties collides with other cherished values.... [O]ne cannot support both liberty and order
at the same time. More precisely, as support for civil liberties increases, support for order and
security decreases, and vice versa.") (citation omitted).
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systems in absolute terms. The starting point for many libertarians and
privacy advocates is Benjamin Franklin's uncompromising statement in
1759, that "[t]hose who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a
little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety."' 3 Oppo-
sitely, one well-known airline CEO gives this ultimatum: "You want to
travel on the airline system? You give up your privacy. You don't want
to give up your privacy? Don't fly. Your privacy isn't equal to the
safety of the rest of us." 4
Rejecting the notion that security is possible only at the expense of
liberty and privacy, 15 this article recommends an aviation security policy
in which profiling plays an integral and lawful role. After detailing spe-
cific government- and private-sector profiling initiatives, this article
assesses airline passenger profiling in terms of three broad questions:
Who is the enemy that aviation security policy intends to identify? Is
profiling rational or racist? And do airline passenger profiling systems
necessarily require a policy choice favoring national security over lib-
erty and privacy rights? Concluding with an overview of international
airline security measures by and between the European Union and the
United States, this article ultimately submits that airline passenger pro-
filing, with its focus on bad people and not just bad things, should be a
centerpiece of national aviation security policy after September 11.
II. PROFILING INITIATIVES
Terrorism has always shadowed commercial airline travel. The
first documented airline hijacking occurred as early as 1931, when Peru-
vian revolutionaries overtook a domestic flight to distribute propa-
ganda. 6 Hijackers have since seized commercial airplanes to bargain
for the exchange of political prisoners or to escape to a particular desti-
nation like Cuba.17 In contrast, the objective of the September 11
13. 6 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 242 (Leonard W. Labaree et al. eds., Yale Univ.
Press 1963); see also Thomas F. Powers, Can We Be Secure and Free?, 151 PuB. INT. 3, 5 (2003)
("In a liberal republic, liberty presupposes security; the point of security is liberty.").
14. Robert Crandall, Security for the Future: Let's Get Our Airlines Flying, Address at the
Freedom Versus Fear: The Future of Air Travel Conference (Oct. 29, 2001), in 67 J. AIR L. &
COM. 7, 19 (2002).
15. See Taipale, supra note 12, at 126 ("The current public debate that pits security and
privacy as dichotomous rivals to be traded one for another in a zero-sum game is based on a
general misunderstanding and apprehension of technology on the one hand and a mythology of
privacy that conflates secrecy with autonomy on the other.").
16. See Humphrey G. Dawson, Civil Aviation, Hijacking and International Terrorism: An
Historical and Legal Review, 15 INT'L Bus. LAW. 57, 58 (1987).
17. See Special Report on Airport Security-Part 1: Government, Industry Face Logistics
Nightmare in Meeting Screening Deadline, AIRPORT SEC. REP., Apr. 10, 2002 ("The hijackers'
success on Sept. 11 relied heavily on their exploitation of the U.S. government's aviation security
policy developed in response to 1970s hijackings of aircraft to Cuba and other destinations. ...
2007]
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hijackers was to kill Americans and to destroy national icons of Ameri-
can economic, military, and political might.' 8
The September 11 hijackers-ten of nineteen were identified for
further security screening by a computer passenger profiling system' 9-
caused a cascade of damage emanating from their hijacking. Their
weapons were not guns and certainly were not the box cutters they used
to gain cockpit access. Rather, in hijacking at least four airplanes, the
September 11 terrorists commandeered the entire U.S. commercial avia-
tion system and existing infrastructure. In doing so, the September 11
terrorists exposed erroneous assumptions on which national aviation
security policy operated for decades. Thus,
[t]he biggest challenge to preventing the civil aircraft from becoming
a weapon of destruction is forty years of accumulated preconceptions
that now need to be overcome. First and foremost, and emotionally
toughest, is the recognition that the survival of the plane and its occu-
pants is no longer the ultimate objective in a situation involving
assailants attempting to seize control of the aircraft. Preventing ter-
rorists from taking over the flight controls, and thus preventing them
from turning the plane into a weapon of further destruction, takes
precedence no matter what the danger to the plane.2°
On the surface, September 11 represented a departure from histori-
cal conceptions of airline terrorism. At the same time, September 11
also represented a failure of aviation security policy makers to appreci-
ate the history of aviation terrorism. A former U.S. Department of
Transportation ("DOT") Inspector General recounted the following:
There was a plot ... to take four jetliners, maybe it was five, depend-
ing on if you count the plane that escaped. Anyway, there was a plot
to take four jetliners. They hijacked them in a jihad to protest
America's role in Israel. In this jihad, they would take the planes and
crash them into something to do maximum harm to a nation and gov-
At that time hijackers wanted to trade passengers and crew for large sums of money, release of
political prisoners and escape to a safe haven .... Groups of hijackers willing to commit suicide
were deemed highly unlikely .... "); see also JAMES A. AREY, THE SKY PIRATES (1972); RODNEY
A. SNYDER, NEGOTIATING WITH TERRORISTS: TWA FLIGHT 847 (1994); Stanley B. Rosenfield, Air
Piracy: Is It Time To Relax Our Security?, 9 NEW ENG. L. REV. 81, 88 (1973-1974); Mark. W.
Levine, Note, Cuban Hijackers and the United States: The Need for a Modified Aut Dedere Aut
Judicare Rule, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 133, 134 (1994).
18. See Moussaoui Trial: A Foiled Hijacker Rejoices over 9/11, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 28,
2006, at Al (" 'You rejoiced in the fact that Americans were killed?' the prosecutor asked. 'That is
correct,' [Zacarias Moussaoui, an al Qaeda conspirator who was part of the 9/11 plot] said, matter-
of-factly. 'You called the collapse of the twin towers "gorgeous?"' 'Indeed.'").
19. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
1 n.2 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 REPORT].
20. Phillip A. Karber, Re-Constructing Global Aviation in an Era of the Civil Aircraft as a
Weapon of Destruction, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 781, 793 (2002) (discussing the innovation
of the September 11 terrorists to create "second-order effects").
[Vol. 62:1
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ernment at which they were very displeased. . . . Sorry, but they
would have casualties. They would not even give them a second
thought.... You think I am talking about September Eleventh, don't
you? I am not.
I happen to be talking about September Twelfth, September 12,
1970. The same thing happened. The four planes were taken to the
Middle East and blown up. In that case, they allowed the passen-
gers-a very bizarre way that they did it, but they allowed the pas-
sengers to scramble to get off the plane.2'
Whatever the novelty or precedence of the tactics of September 11,
the terrorist threat confronting today's airlines is conceptually different
from national security concerns that previously confronted aviation
security policy makers. Whereas the Soviet Union created "things" dur-
ing the Cold War that could be observed and countered, terrorism is an
indefinite threat, as "the terrorists create only transactions that can be
sifted from the noise of everyday activity only with great difficulty. '22
In this new context, airline profiling systems may offer aviation security
officials a preemptive and forward-looking mechanism to identify
terrorists. 2
3
But profiling airline passengers is controversial. Critics of airline
passenger profiling systems voice four main concerns. First, privacy
advocates and civil libertarians contend that profiling systems as secur-
ity measures are too extreme. According to those critics, would-be ter-
rorists with September 1 -like intentions constitute a discrete minority
of the traveling population. Consequently, profiling systems are not the
least intrusive security alternative because they intrude into the privacy
of the overwhelming majority of airline passengers who pose no threat
to aviation security.2 4
21. Mary Schiavo, Flying Right: What It Takes To Make Aviation Safer and More Secure
After 2001, 14 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 279, 295 (2002). One author suggests "[t]he first attempt to
convert a hijacked aircraft into a flying bomb targeted on a symbol of international salience, and
the only known prequel to September 11, was the Christmas Eve 1994 hijacking of a French
Airbus by a four-man team from the Algerian terrorist movement GIA, who wanted to crash the
plane into the Eiffel Tower." Karber, supra note 20, at 789.
22. Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DuQ. L. REV. 663, 679
(2004). An extensive unclassified database of terrorism attacks, called the Global Terrorism
Database, is available online at http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd. "The database was developed
by Start, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, based at
the University of Maryland, with funding from the U.S. Homeland Security Department. It
includes 80,000 terror incidents from 1970-2004. Start plans to update the database through 2007
within the next twelve months." The Global Terrorism Database, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
May 28, 2007, at 23.
23. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: SHIFTING FROM PROSECUTION TO PREVENTION,
REDESIGNING THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT To PREVENT FUTURE ACTs OF TERRORISM (2002), http://
www.fas.org/irp/news/2002/05/fbireorganizationfactsheet.pdf.
24. See infra Part III.
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Second, profiling critics wonder about the source and ownership of
information in passenger dossiers. Arguably, profiling systems deprive
travelers of control over their personal information. The federal govern-
ment refuses to disclose precisely what information it will rely on to
compile a passenger profile and threat assessment. The government
alone knows the source of profiling data. Some profiling system critics
argue that the source of the government's profiling data is untrustworthy
commercial databases that have nothing to do with airline travel.
Third, profiling systems are operationally ineffective, producing
"false positives" and "false negatives." Anecdotal evidence of existing
profiling systems identifying law-abiding passengers for heightened
screening or unnecessary interrogations or both is discouraging. For
example, TSA, FBI, and the Secret Service have stopped an airline pas-
senger from Kentucky twenty-two different times because his name is
similar to that of an apparent financier of al Qaeda.26 Meanwhile,
existing screening systems failed to notice anything remarkable when
the name of America's most-wanted fugitive, Osama Bin Ladin, was
tested .2  These infrequent but not unique experiences, aggravated by the
evolving danger of identity theft, illustrate a serious defect of an aviation
security regime dependent on machines to make threat assessments.28
Finally, while airline passengers may pose unequal security risks as
a matter of fact, profiling systems treat passengers unequally and dis-
criminatorily as a matter of law. Critics of airline passenger profiling
specifically contend that computerized screening is internally biased
against passengers with connections to areas of the world whose behav-
ior or policies conflict with the interests of the United States-namely
the Middle East. As such, critics believe that profiling would promote
an unconstitutional categorization of travelers by ethnicity, race, relig-
ion, or a combination of all three. 29 And although the federal govern-
25. See infra Part II.B-C.
26. Talk of the Nation: Flight Passenger Screening (National Public Radio broadcast, Sept.
22, 2004) [hereinafter Talk of the Nation]; see also infra note 103 and accompanying text.
27. Timothy W. Maier, Cracks in System Open to Terrorists, INSIGHT, Mar. 15, 2004, at 26.
28. See Addie S. Ries, Comment, America's Anti-Hijacking Campaign-Will It Conform to
Our Constitution?, 3 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 123, 150 (2001) ("[T]echnologies presently used to search
passengers are sufficient if operated in a competent manner. [But] too much reliance on
technology diverts attention from the human components necessary for an effective security
program."). Using mathematical models and computer simulation, students at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology wrote a paper showing "how a terrorist cell can increase thier chances of
mounting a successful attack under the CAPS system as opposed to a security system that uses
only random searches." Samidh Chakrabarti & Aaron Strauss, Carnival Booth: An Algorithm for
Defeating the Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening System, FIRST MONDAY, Oct. 2002, http://
www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue7-10/chakrabarti.
29. In considering whether the incidence of stopping minorities at an airport was
disproportionate to that for whites when compared with the total number of travelers, a federal
[Vol. 62:1
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ment has rejected the notion that profiling operates on this basis, many
critics of airline passenger profiling systems maintain that the govern-
ment cannot be trusted to design egalitarian machinery that ignores the
shared ethnic, geo-cultural, or religious backgrounds of the September
11 terrorists. Profiling system proponents counter this concern with an
appeal to common sense: We should use what we know about past ter-
rorists. While this may be true in a practical sense, profiling raises more
nuanced legal issues. This section presents the major private and gov-
ernment profiling initiatives since September 11 and addresses the prac-
tical and legal benefits of both, as well as their drawbacks.
A. Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS)
The Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") mandated passenger
profiling in the 1960s in response to increased airliner hijackings during
that period.30 Federal security officials believed they could identify
potential hijackers based on a profile-a mosaic of personal attributes
hijackers typically possessed.3' Specifically, FAA's "Anti-Air Hijack
Profile" established approximately twenty-five characteristics empiri-
cally linked with hijackers historically.32 If a passenger fit a "profile,"
district court noted that the racial and ethnic division of all airline travelers nationally was 88%
white, 5% African American, 1% Asian, 1% Hispanic, and 4% "other." United States v. Travis,
837 F. Supp. 1386, 1390 (E.D. Ky. 1993).
30. The first hijacking of a commercial airplane in the United States occurred in 1961 and
involved the diversion of a flight originating from Key West, Florida to Cuba. See Jack H. Daniel
III, Comment, Reform in Airport Security: Panic or Precaution?, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1623, 1625
(2002). From 1961 to 1973, approximately 343 hijackings took place. Deterring Airport
Terrorist Attacks and Compensating the Victims, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1134, 1134 n.3 (1977).
31. Computer-based profiling generally involves two different types of data: pattern based
and subject based. James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1464 (2004). Pattern-based searches commonly occur in the
consumer sector in tracking customer purchases and preventing credit card fraud. See id. at 1463.
Whereas "'pattern-based' searches ... refer to searches of large databases when the query does
not name a specific individual, address, identification number, or other personally identifiable data
element, but instead seeks information that matches or departs from a pattern. . ., 'subject-based'
queries are data searches that seek information about a particular subject already under suspicion
based on information derived from traditional investigative means, whether that subject is
represented by a name, a telephone number, or a bank account number." Id. at 1464. For a
discussion of the usefulness of data mining for homeland security, including a review of private
and public initiatives such as the Terrorism Information Awareness project ("TIA"), CAPPS II,
Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange ("MATRIX"), and the Able Danger program,
see JEFFREY W. SEIFERT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DATA MINING AND HOMELAND SECURITY: AN
OVERVIEW 4-20 (2007), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intelVRL31798.pdf.
32. In United States v. Slocum, a federal appellate court considered the Federal Aviation
Administration's Anti-Air Hijack Profile and concluded:
The practicalities of commercial air transportation dictate that any attempts to
discover potential hijackers among scheduled passengers be carried out with
minimum disruption of the boarding procedures. The Profile meets in part this
objective by immediately restricting application of the intrusive aspects of the
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security officials X-rayed the passenger's carry-on luggage or investi-
gated the passenger through other search procedures.33 But FAA aban-
doned profiling in 1972, finding it ineffective. Instead, FAA created
global security checkpoints to X-ray all carry-on luggage.34
The perceived need for airline passenger screening was renewed
after July 17, 1996 when a Boeing 747, TWA Flight 800 flying from
New York to Paris, exploded soon after it took off.35 Although a defec-
tive fuel tank caused the tragedy,36 government officials initially
believed that terrorists had destroyed TWA Flight 800.37 Consequently,
on August 22, 1996 President Bill Clinton announced the creation of the
"White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. '38 This
program. Its compilation of easily observable, nondiscriminatory indicia
characteristic of the hijacking problem focuses the program on a limited number of
persons among each group of boarding passengers. We cannot conclude that solely
because the Profile operates on the basis of a statistical comparison of the
passengers to past hijackers that, necessarily, it should be considered as an attempt
to establish probable cause and, therefore, be subject to scrutiny according to 4th
Amendment standards.
464 F.2d 1180, 1183 (3d Cir. 1972); see also Abraham Abramovsky, The Constitutionality of the
Anti-Hijacking Security System, 22 BuFF. L. REV. 123, 131 (1973); Alona E. Evans, Aircraft
Hijacking, What Is Being Done, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 641, 648-63 (1973); Gary N. Horlick, The
Developing Law of Air Hijacking, 12 HARV. INT'L L.J. 33 (1971). See generally James L.
Buchwalier, Validity of Airport Security Measures, 125 A.L.R. 5th 281 (2005).
33. E.g., Stephen P. Halbrook, Firearms, The Fourth Amendment, and Air Carrier Security,
52 J. AIR L. & CoM. 585, 640 (1987).
34. See, e.g., Santiago v. State, 435 A.2d 499, 500-02 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981); Gregory
T. Nojeim, Aviation Security Profiling and Passengers' Civil Liberties, AIR & SPACE LAW.,
Summer 1998, at 3, 6 ("Profiling did not work to stop hijacking. In 1972, the last year (1972) the
United States used profiles to determine whose carry-on luggage would be X-rayed to stop
hijacking, there were 28 hijackings of U.S. passenger aircraft. Hijacking dropped off when
profiling was abandoned and every passenger's carry-on luggage was X-rayed.").
35. Judy Pasternak, Response to Terror Air Security, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6. 2001, at 1.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. WHITE HOUSE COMM'N ON AVIATION SAFETY & SEC., FINAL REPORT TO PRESIDENT
CLINTON 3 n.5 (1997) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE COMM'N FINAL REPORT], available at http:f/
www.fas.org/irp/threat/212fin-1.html; see Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Airline Safety and
Security: An Analysis of the White House Commission's Recommendations, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 791, 792 (1997). Also in 1996, Congress revised section 307 of the Federal Aviation
Reauthorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat. 3253, and directed the Federal
Aviation Administration to assist airlines in developing a computer assisted passenger profiling
system in conjunction with other security measures and technologies. In the same year, Congress
amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2000)), enacting the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 to eliminate immunity that foreign states enjoyed from the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts in cases involving torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage,
hostage taking, and other acts undertaken by an officials, employees, or agents of foreign states.
Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1605); see also
Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1247-48 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (explaining how the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act altered the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
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body, which also was known as the "Gore Commission," was charged
with "develop[ing] and recommend[ing] to the President a strategy
designed to improve aviation safety and security, both domestically and
internationally."39 The Gore Commission issued its final report in Febru-
ary 1997, making several security recommendations including the revi-
talization and reformulation of passenger profiling from the 1960s:
First, FBI, CIA, and [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms]
should evaluate and expand the research into known terrorists, hijack-
ers, and bombers needed to develop the best possible profiling sys-
tem. They should keep in mind that such a profile would be most
useful to the airlines if it could be matched against automated passen-
ger information which the airlines maintain.
Second, the FBI and CIA should develop a system that would allow
important intelligence information on known or suspected terrorists
to be used in passenger profiling without compromising the integrity
of the intelligence or its sources....
Third, the Commission will establish an advisory board on civil liber-
ties questions that arise from the development and use of profiling
systems.40
FAA developed a computer assisted passenger screening program using
this blueprint.
The first-generation computer airline passenger profiling system
was developed by Northwest Airlines in 1996 under a grant from
FAA.41 After testing a prototype, Northwest Airlines released the profil-
ing software to other airlines through the FAA in 1997.42 The profiling
39. Exec. Order No. 13,015, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,937 (Aug. 22, 1996).
40. WHITE HOUSE COMM'N FINAL REPORT, supra note 38, § 3.19. The airlines themselves
protested the Gore Commission's final report, citing implementation costs and decrying
government overreach. See Pastemak, supra note 35, at 1. Vice President Al Gore wrote a letter
to the president of the Air Transport Association of America, stating, "I want to make it very clear
that it is not the intent of this administration or of the commission to create a hardship for the air
transportation industry." The O'Reilly Factor: Did Al Gore Increase or Jeopardize Airline
Security? (Fox television broadcast Sept. 27, 2001). At least one commentator saw an unnatural
relationship between this letter and donations that were subsequently made to the Democratic
National Convention in the closing weeks of the 1996 presidential election: $265,000 from
American Airlines, $120,000 from Delta Airlines, $115,000 from United Airlines, and $87,000
from Northwest Airlines. Id; see also Walter V. Robinson & Glen Johnson, Airlines Fought
Security Changes Despite Warning, Companies Wanted To Avoid Delays, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
20, 2001, at Al (discussing the Gore Commission and airline security standards in the wake of
September 11).
41. See Bill Dedman, FAA Looking To Expand System, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12, 2001, at A27
("CAPS was born in February 1995 in a hotel room in Washington. The host for the small group
of government security specialists-which included the FBI, Secret Service and US Customs
Service-was Jay Dombrowski, the security chief for Northwest Airlines. CAPS is his creation.
'I wrote it,' he says, 'but they set the profile.'").
42. Id.
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software operated through the internal computer reservation system of
each airline and was known as the "Computer Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System" ("CAPPS").4 3 The government presented this ini-
tial device not as a profiling system, but as a "management tool"; its
goal was "not to pick a needle out of the haystack .... but to make the
haystack smaller."'
CAPPS collects approximately thirty-nine pieces of pre-boarding
data on random and ordered bases.4" The data that CAPPS collects
helps to identify travelers who should be subjected to heightened secur-
ity procedures. To the distress of privacy advocates, CAPPS profiles are
confidential.46 As one commentator noted, "[m]aking profiles public is
necessary to make them legal, however, doing so would also destroy
their usefulness."47 Indeed, the government will not disclose any crite-
rion on which a CAPPS profile is compiled, but some airline security
observers discern that CAPPS focuses on specific features such as the
method of payment for an airline ticket (i.e., cash or credit);4 8 the timing
of a purchase (i.e., immediately before departure or much earlier);49 the
identity of travelers,5" including with whom, if anybody, the passenger
is traveling; the activity at the destination, including whether the passen-
ger intends to rent a car; the flight itinerary, including where the flight
originates and its ultimate destination; the passenger's specific travel
plans, including ultimate destination when different from the flight on
which the traveler is aboard; and whether the flight is round trip or one-
way.5' A traveler identified by CAPPS as a "selectee" is subject to sec-
43. See id.; Billie H. Vincent, Letter to the Editor, Or Keep CAPPS On?, SECURITY MGmT.,
Aug. 2004, at 8, 8. For political reasons, the Federal Aviation Administration ostensibly changed
the initial name of CAPPS from "Computer Assisted Passenger Profile System" to "Computer
Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System." See id. (emphasis added).
44. Dedman, supra note 41, at A27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Ian Kilroy, Flying in the Face of Privacy, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003, at 15.
46. See Nojeim, supra note 34, at 5.
47. Jamie L. Rhee, Comment, Rational and Constitutional Approaches to Airline Safety in the
Face of Terrorist Threats, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 847, 865 (2000).
48. See Richard Lowry, Profiles in Cowardice: How To Deal with the Terrorist Threat-And
How Not To, NAT'L REV., Jan. 28, 2002, at 32, 34 (citing a report that the September 11 hijackers
of American Airlines Flight 77 "reserved their tickets by credit card, but paid in cash").
49. Morning Edition: Status of Airport Security in America (National Public Radio broadcast
Sept. 19, 2001) (reporting that "five of the [September 11] hijackers who later crashed United
Airlines Right 175 into the south tower of the World Trade Center, purchased very expensive
one-way tickets; $14,000 for five tickets. The tickets were purchased at the last minute.").
50. See Wave of Security Changes Are Coming After Terrorist Hijacking in U.S., WORLD
AIRPORT WK., Sept. 18, 2001, at 2001 WLNR 399475 ("The FAA's Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System (CAPPS) did not work.... Most of these terrorists had been in the country
for some time, leading middle-income lifestyles with a good education, good-paying jobs and
families."). For more discussion on the background of would-be terrorists, see sources cited infra
note 163.
51. Morning Edition, supra note 49.
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ondary screening:
Depending on the destination of the passenger (domestic or foreign)
and the availability of advanced technology at particular airports, the
additional security measure applied to selectees typically will involve
one of the following: bag matching (the requirement that checked
luggage be flown only if it is determined that the passenger who
checked the luggage has boarded the airplane); examination by a cer-
tified explosive detection system (EDS); or examination using other
advanced technology (such as explosive detection device or a trace
detector).5 2
CAPPS critics asserted that profiling would not work. They noted
that profiling outside of the aviation arena had been unsuccessful; for
instance, the U.S. Customs Service has not stopped the drug trade using
profiling.53 Profiling system critics also argued that CAPPS would not
have prevented even the first documented bombing of a commercial air-
plane in the United States. That event occurred in 1955 when a passen-
ger's son covertly packed a bomb in his mother's luggage to collect
insurance policy proceeds.54  The unsuspecting passenger boarded her
fateful flight without drawing any additional security screening. Profil-
ing would likely have been ineffective in this circumstance, where an
innocent passenger was manipulated for a sinister purpose. Today,
too, the risk of "false negatives," where crucial people or events are
missed, is real.56 Accordingly, critics of airline passenger profiling sys-
tems dismiss both the theory and operation of CAPPS and related pro-
grams as over-inclusive, flagging up to half of all passengers yet missing
52. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION ON THE DEPARTMENT'S CIVIL RIGHTS REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED AUTOMATED PASSENGER SCREENING SYSTEM (1997) [hereinafter
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS REVIEW], available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/sac/miO50l/
app.htm.
53. Nojeim, supra note 34, at 6.
54. See Schiavo, supra note 21, at 295; see also Ted Rohrlich, Response to Terror Aviation
Security, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001, at Al ("How long does it take the United States to counter a
threat to commercial aviation? In the case of a bomb stowed in luggage in the belly of an airliner,
the answer is nearly half a century. And counting. Since a man placed a bomb in his mother's
suitcase in 1955 and blew up a United Airlines flight over Colorado, more than two dozen fatal
explosions have been recorded on aircraft around the world.").
55. Greg Nojeim, legislative counsel at the American Civil Liberties Union and member of
the Gore advisory panel, said, "This is not going to make all passengers safer. It only tells the
terrorists that they should plant the bomb on someone who doesn't fit the profile." Tiffany
Danitz, Snooping on Passengers Under FAA's Watchful Eye, INSIGHT, Mar. 31, 1997, at 22, 23.
56. See Anita Ramasastry, Lost in Translation? Data Mining, National Security and the
"Adverse Inference" Problem, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 757, 761 (2006);
see also Stephen W. Dummer, False Positives and Secure Flight Using Dataveillance When
Viewed Through the Ever Increasing Likelihood of Identity Theft, II J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 259
(2006); Michael 0. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, On the Probative Value of Evidence from a
Screening Search, 43 JURIMETRICS 265 (2003).
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vital targets.57
Airline passenger profiling critics also have voiced concern about
the potential, if not actual use, of race to identify travelers for heightened
scrutiny. The DOT represented that CAPPS variables "are not based on
the race, ethnicity, religion or gender of passengers." 8 Additionally, the
Gore Commission officially recommended the use of safeguards against
race-based profiling, stating that profiles should not include information
of a constitutionally suspect nature such as race, religion, or national
origin.59 Those safeguards emphasized using verifiable profile factors
that are based on data proven to predict risk, setting up strict limits on
dissemination of profile records, creating an independent panel to moni-
tor the system and to ensure that civil liberties are not abridged, and
continuing profiling only until effective Explosive Detection Systems
are developed.60 The Gore Commission elaborated that
[f]actors to be considered for elements of the profile should be based
on measurable, verifiable data indicating that the factors chosen are
reasonable predictors of risk, not stereotypes or generalizations. A
relationship must be demonstrated between the factors chosen and the
risk of illegal activity.
Procedures for searching the person or luggage of, or for questioning,
a person who is selected by the automated profiling system should be
premised on insuring respectful, non-stigmatizing, and efficient treat-
ment of all passengers.61
In 1997, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") reviewed the
selection criteria used by CAPPS and opined that CAPPS did not dis-
criminate unlawfully against passengers or include passenger traits, such
as names or mode of dress, that may directly be associated with race,
ethnicity, or religion.62 The DOJ concluded that CAPPS "will not have
57. See Rosenzweig, supra note 22, at 712.
58. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp., DOT Investigates Passenger Security Screening's
Impact on Minorities (June 4, 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.
dot.gov/affairs/dot5501 .htm.
59. WHITE HOUSE COMM'N FINAL REPORT, supra note 38, § 3.19.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS REVIEW, supra note 52 ("The Department of Justice's
principal finding is that the FAA's proposed Computer Assisted Screening system ('CAPS') will
not discriminate on the basis of race, color, national or ethnic origin, religion, or gender.")
(emphasis in original); see also Justice Department Says Proposed Passenger Profiling System
Non-Discriminatory, AIR SAFETY WK., Oct. 20, 1997, at 6 (stating that the DOJ reviewed the
proposed passenger system and issued recommendations to ensure that CAPS would not
discriminate against passengers). See generally Graeme Browning, Big Brother May Get His Big
Chance, NAT'L J., Sept. 21, 1996, at 2037 (discussing the use of technology in the computer-
generated profiling system).
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any unjustified disparate impact on any group of passengers."63 Profil-
ing system opponents nevertheless found the Gore Commission's stated
goals specious, and the DOJ's conclusions unbelievable.
Finally, some CAPPS critics questioned the source, integrity, and
potential for misuse of information ostensibly used for airline passenger
profiling. Some CAPPS opponents specifically cautioned against the
dissemination of CAPPS profiles to other governmental agencies for
purposes unrelated to terrorism or aviation security. The American Civil
Liberties Union ("ACLU"), in particular, argued that the profiling sys-
tem raised concerns about personal privacy:
By its very nature, the computerized profiling system runs afoul of a
central principle of privacy: Information given for one purpose ought
not be used for other purposes without the consent of the person to
whom it pertains. People book a flight, or enroll in a frequent flyer
program, not because they want to yield up data about themselves for
a massive profiling system, but because they want to travel, and occa-
sionally, travel for free.
The computerized profiling system relies on portions of the wealth of
data airlines collect about passengers for reasons other than profiling.
Information airlines collect about their passengers includes name,
address, the destinations to which a passenger flies with a particular
airline, how the passenger paid for their tickets and who may have
purchased the tickets for the passenger, the people with whom the
passenger has traveled, whether the passenger booked onward travel
such as a car or hotel, and other information. This personal data
needs to be protected.64
To protect airline passenger privacy without a corresponding decline in
aviation security, the ACLU imagined security measures other than pro-
filing, including training security personnel to identify tangible evidence
of suspected criminal activity on reasonable; articulable bases other than
stereotypes; screening airline personnel and employees of air security
vendors (within constitutional means); adding measures to enforce
security standards at foreign airports; and limiting FBI and law enforce-
ment access to passenger records except pursuant to a court order based
63. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS REVIEW, supra note 52.
64. Nojeim, supra note 34, at 7; see also id. at 5 ("Other security measures, which could well
be applied to passengers selected by the computerized profiling system . . . include: asking
passengers personal questions about their travel; having their luggage sniffed by trained dogs;
removing the contents of . . . luggage and examining each item in front of other passengers;
escorting the passenger through the airport 'for security reasons' in full view of other passengers;
or using sophisticated 'cameras' to peer under their clothing and project a detailed image of their
bodies, naked, in a search for contraband, explosives, or weapons."). But see Taipale, supra note
12, at 140-41 ("[I]t is the fetish for absolute secrecy promulgated by the privacy lobby that
precludes or delays the development of appropriate technologies to improve security while also
protecting civil liberties, and leaves us with little security and brittle privacy protection.").
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on probable cause of criminality. 65 After September 11, however, avia-
tion security policy makers moved to enhance CAPPS capabilities.
B. CAPPS H
Senior government officials described the proposed successor pro-
filing system to CAPPS I as the single most important component of the
nation's aviation security infrastructure.6 6 "CAPPS II" was designed to
authenticate the identity of commercial airline passengers by comparing
each traveler's passenger name record ("PNR"), including full name,
home address, telephone number and date of birth, against governmental
databases for security assessment. 67 The aim of CAPPS II was to bridge
law enforcement and intelligence databases. "CAPPS II also would
have notified law enforcement officials whenever the screening process
turned up passengers with outstanding warrants against them, even for
non-travel-related incidents. 68  Controversially, then, CAPPS II
exploited commercial databases for counterterrorism purposes.
Opponents argued that CAPPS II would interfere with an airline
passenger's constitutional rights by using commercial databases for pur-
poses unrelated to airline travel. For example, an airline passenger who
has filed for bankruptcy or is late in paying credit card bills may be a
bad credit risk, but is not necessarily a terrorist threat because of finan-
cial delinquency. Nonetheless, a profiling system might equate eco-
nomic disadvantage with "shiftiness. 69 In this context, many CAPPS II
critics viewed the use of commercial databases to safeguard airline
travel as an unacceptably high cost to passenger privacy rights.
To defeat CAPPS II, civil liberty and privacy proponents publicized
several embarrassing operational failures of CAPPS I. In September
65. Nojeim, supra note 34, at 9.
66. Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Airport Screening System Touted as Improvement, WASH. POST,
Aug. 27, 2004, at E03 ("People close to the program said recently that Bush administration
officials made it clear this summer that they were worried that the privacy questions sparked by
the system could have a political impact during the presidential campaign. Security officials have
postponed both testing and implementation of the system until after the election."). See generally
Deborah von Rochow-Leuschner, CAPPS H and the Fourth Amendment: Does It Fly?, 69 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 139, 146 (2004); Michael J. DeGrave, Note, Airline Passenger Profiling and the
Fourth Amendment: Will CAPPS II Be Cleared for Takeoff?, 10 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 125, 151
(2004).
67. See Yousri Omar, Note, Plane Harassment: The Transportation Security Administration's
Indifference to the Constitution in Administering the Government's. Watch Lists, 12 WASH. & LEE
J. C.R. & Soc. JUST. 259, 271-72 (2006).
68. Larry Greenemeier, TSA Extends Registered Traveler Program to Reagan National,
TECHWEBNEWS, Sept. 3, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 4752237.
69. Ramasastry, supra note 56, at 777. See generally Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother's
Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your
Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REo. 595 (2004) (discussing the use of
personal commercial data for the purpose of law enforcement).
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2004 British pop star Cat Stevens (who became a Muslim in the 1970s
and is known today as Yusuf Islam) 70 was removed from an interna-
tional flight bound for the United States. Stevens's name was on the
government's "No-Fly" list.7 ' CAPPS I also identified U.S. Senator
Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) and U.S. Representative Don Young (R-
Alaska) for extra security scrutiny.72 CAPPS II opponents used these
examples to contend that airline passenger profiling systems would not
lawfully or reliably make airline travel safer, but rather would produce
unintended and negative consequences for airline passengers.
In all, the chief concern surrounding CAPPS II was "mission
creep," whereby information intended for one purpose might be
exploited for unintended purposes.7 3 CAPPS II critics argued that the
information comprising an airline passenger profile might unacceptably
slip, bit-by-bit, into the hands of non-TSA governmental actors for uses
outside of aviation security.74 In this way, airline passenger profiling
systems are unique for their invasiveness: 75
For example, if you do not buy the book Amazon.com recommended
to you based on other customers' buying patterns, the negative conse-
70. Airline "Safeguards" Intrusive, and They Don't Work, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETrE
(Indiana), Sept. 24, 2004, available at 2004 WL 15166654.
71. Id.; see also Today (NBC television broadcast Sept. 23, 2004). Matt Lauer asked Asa
Hutchinson, Homeland Security Undersecretary, regarding the placement of Cat Stevens on a
terror watch list: "Mr. Secretary, this is a high profile example. How often do you think this really
happens?" "Very infrequently," Hutchinson replied. Id. No-Fly and selectee lists are
administered by the Transportation Security Intelligence Service as "security directives" issued by
the Under Secretary of the TSA. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 114(l)(2)(A) (West 2007). Security directives
are issued without notice or opportunity for public comment. Id.
72. Rachel L. Swarns, Senator? Terrorist? A Watch List Stops Kennedy at Airport, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, at A]; Sara Kehaulani Goo, Faulty "No-Fly" System Detailed, WASH.
POST, Oct. 9, 2004, at A01.
73. See JEFFREY W. SEIFERT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DATA MINING AND HOMELAND
SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW 22-23 (2007), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/inteIRL31798.pdf; see also
Ramasastry, supra note 56, at 762; DANIEL J. WEITNZER ET AL., MIT COMPUTER ScI. AND
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE LAB., TRANSPARENT ACCOUNTABLE DATA MINING: NEW STRATEGIES
FOR PRIVACY PROTECTION 3 (2006), http://www.w3.org/2006/01/tami-privacy-strategies-aaai.pdf.
74. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AVIATION SECURITY: COMPUTER-AssISTED
PASSENGER PRESCREENING SYSTEM FACES SIGNIFICANT IMPLENTATION CHALLENGES 42 (2004),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04385.pdf.
75. See Angela Kim, ACLU Skeptical of TSA 's New Passenger Screening System, AVIATION
DAILY, Aug. 30, 2004, at 1. David Stanley, Communications Director of ACLU's Technology
and Liberty Program, stated, "Identity-based security systems are never going to be effective. The
focus should be on physical screening, good intelligence, [and] good police footwork to chase
down leads." Id. Independent of aviation profiling programs, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
is currently developing a computer profiling system-the System to Assess Risk ("STAR")-to
identify emergent foreign threats in order to assign risk scores to possible suspects such as credit
bureaus assign rating to consumers based on spending behavior and debt. See Ellen Nakashima,
FBI Plans Initiative To Profile Terrorists; Potential Targets Get Risk Rating, WASH. POST, July
11, 2007, at A08.
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quences are slight. If your credit card company puts a hold on the
use of your card because it noticed an odd usage pattern and sus-
pected someone might have stolen your card, you can explain and
continue to use your card. But the consequences of using data for
counterterrorism purposes can be much more serious. They can
include arrest, deportation, loss of a job, greater scrutiny at various
screening gates, investigation or surveillance, or being added to a
watch list.
7 6
These criticisms eventually reached TSA, which offered to make several
modifications to the proposed CAPPS II program.
TSA suggested three significant amendments to the CAPPS II
design.77 First, TSA agreed to erase most passenger information in the
CAPPS II system within seven days after passengers completed their
scheduled travel. 78 TSA also proposed appellate mechanisms for pas-
sengers erroneously targeted for heightened, secondary security screen-
ing.79 Most important, TSA proposed limiting the use of private
commercial data to compose a traveler's security profile.80 In particular,
TSA proposed transmitting PNR information to commercial data provid-
ers solely for the purpose of authenticating a passenger's identity. 8'
Commercial data miners, in turn, would evaluate whether a passenger is
who he represented he was when reserving a flight.82 On completion of
this authentication process, the CAPPS II system would review a pas-
senger's commercial identity against intelligence and law enforcement
databases.83 Passengers positively identified without any corresponding
matches with intelligence or law enforcement data would proceed to
their flights.84 Those passengers with more remarkable profiles would
be subjected to further search or law enforcement action or both.8"
CAPPS II opponents viewed these measures as insufficient and CAPPS
II never materialized.
Apart from external criticism and its substantive problems, CAPPS
II was defeated because it was a marketing disaster. By developing the
system without notice or opportunity for meaningful public comment,
TSA did precisely what privacy advocates cautioned CAPPS II would
76. Dempsey & Flint, supra note 31, at 1471.
77. See Interim Final Privacy Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,265 (Aug. 1, 2003); Privacy Notice
Act, 68 Fed. Reg. 2101 (Jan. 15, 2003).
78. Interim Final Privacy Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,267.
79. Id. at 45,269.
80. Id. at 45,267.
81. Id. at 45,266.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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do-deny citizens due process of the law. The fact that CAPPS II was
developed behind the closed doors fueled civil libertarian charges that
the federal government was overrunning the Constitution.
Opposition to the CAPPS II program peaked when the nation
learned that some airlines voluntarily provided TSA with lists of their
respective passengers for testing in the CAPPS II system. JetBlue Air-
ways, for instance, was sued for providing a data-mining government
contractor with millions of passenger records (including names,
addresses, and phone numbers).86 A consumer research company evalu-
ated these records, which included information about each passenger's
demographics, including occupation, income, gender, home- and car-
ownership history, and household composition.87 This information was
collected and transmitted without the knowledge or consent of the pas-
sengers whose identity was disclosed.88 Several other airlines were sued
as their collaboration with the federal government to develop CAPPS II
emboldened profiling system opponents.89 Ultimately, CAPPS II was
defeated by the concern of marrying PNR data with commercial and law
enforcement databases. TSA abandoned CAPPS II on July 13, 2004,
after the U.S. General Accounting Office reported that "[u]ntil TSA
finalizes its privacy plans for CAPPS II and addresses such concerns, we
lack assurance that the system will fully comply with the Privacy Act."90
C. Secure Flight
TSA followed its aborted CAPPS II program with "Secure Flight,"
in August 2004. Secure Flight was a product of the "Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Act of 2004" through which Congress required
86. Philip Shenon, Airline Gave Up Passenger Data: Private Information on Customers Was
Given to Defense Contractor To Assess Terrorism Risks, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 20,
2003, at A5.
87. See TORCH CONCEPTS, INC., HOMELAND SECURITY-AIRLINE PASSENGER RISK
ASSESSMENT (2003), http://www.abditum.com/-rabbi/S3B3-Roark.pdf.
88. See In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
89. See, e.g., In re American Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552 (N.D. Tex.
2005); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 384 F. Supp. 2d 100, 104 (D.D.C.
2005); Dyer v. Northwest Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D.N.D. 2004); In re Northwest
Airlines Privacy Litig., No. 04-126, 2004 WL 1278459 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004); Turrett v. JetBlue
Airways, No. 03-6785, 2003 WL 22843134 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2003). See generally Richard
Sobel & John A. Fennel, Troubles with Hiibel: How the Court Inverted the Relationship Between
Citizens and the State, 48 S. TEx. L. REV. 613 (2007); Drew Shenkman, Comment, Flying the
Not-So-Private Skies: How Passengers' Personal Information Privacy Stopped at the Airplane
Door, and What (If Anything) May Be Done To Get It Back, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 667
(2007). For a discussion of the doctrine of standing in lawsuits involving data-mining and
surveillance see Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, VA. L. REV. 1663, 1687-88
(2007).
90. AVIATION SECURITY: COMPUTER-AssISTED PASSENGER PRESCREENING SYSTEM FACES
SIGNIFICANT IMPLENTATION CHALLENGES, supra note 74, at 42.
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TSA to "commence testing of an advanced passenger prescreening sys-
tem that will allow the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") to
assume the performance of comparing passenger information.., to the
automatic selectee and no fly lists."91 Secure Flight was designed to
improve government "No-Fly" and "automatic selectee" lists.9 2 It was
designed to reduce the number of domestic airline passengers pulled
aside for more rigorous screening while increasing the chance of catch-
ing known or suspected terrorists.93 Secure Flight would be built on the
technology platform of its controversial predecessor, CAPPS II. The
technical similarity between CAPPS II and Secure Flight encouraged the
contention that Secure Flight was a euphemism, nothing more than "a
stripped-down version of the old CAPPS II system with a more con-
sumer-friendly name."94
Similar to CAPPS II, Secure Flight represented ongoing efforts by
the executive branch of the federal government to involve itself directly
with aviation security after September 11. For example, Secure Flight
would shift passenger prescreening responsibilities from the privatized
airlines to the federal government.95 Airlines currently compare passen-
ger names with government provided terrorist watch lists, which are
based on recommendations and information received from federal agen-
cies, including intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Certain sen-
91. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 102,
118 Stat. 3638, 3715.
92. See generally Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1140 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 929 (2007) (rejecting an airline passenger's claim that the government's identification
policy, including CAPPS, CAPPS II, and No-Fly and Selectee lists, were an unconstitutional
"scheme"); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 988 F.2d 186, 197-98 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(upholding aviation security rules adopted by the Federal Aviation Administration in response to
the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990); Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. C06-
00545 WHA, 2006 WL 2374645 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006) (finding that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a No-Fly List); Garrett Hodes,
Comment, Terrorist Threats: The Friendly Skies Aren't Too Friendly About Notification, 46 U.
KAN. L. REV. 365, 368 (1998) (discussing the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 and
public notifications of terrorist threats to civil aviation); Peter M. Shane, The Bureaucratic Due
Process of Government Watch Lists, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 804 (2007).
93. See Daniel J. Steinbock, Designating the Dangerous: From Blacklists to Watch Lists, 30
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 65, 77-89 (2006); Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, New Passenger Profiling System
To Be Tested, L.A. Tinms, Aug. 27, 2004, at A12; Angela Kim, TSA Directs Airlines To Hand
over PNR in 40 Days, AvIATION DAIY, Sept. 22, 2004, at 1.
94. Bill Scannell, TSA Cannot Be Trusted, USA TODAY, Sept. 28, 2004, at 12A.
95. Congress federalized the aviation security system after September 11, 2001. In addition
to creating DHS (of which TSA is a part) in November, 2001, the government also assumed
responsibility for screening passengers, a task historically managed by private airlines through
independent contractors. As a result, all airport screeners are federal employees. See Aviation
and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). See generally Andrew Hessick, The Federalization of Airport
Security: Privacy Implications, 24 WHa-riER L. REV. 43 (2002).
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sitive government watch list information, however, is not available to
airlines. To close this intelligence gap, Secure Flight would have uni-
fied the process of comparing passenger identification with government
data by having the government alone make this comparison relative to
the government's own watch lists, including a Terrorist Screening
Database ("TSDB").96
TSA promoted Secure Flight as a system different from CAPPS II.
Secure Flight would access commercial databases only to confirm the
actual identity of a traveler and to compute a risk score only for pur-
poses related to commercial aviation security. Additionally, TSA pro-
posed that Secure Flight would be augmented by an appellate process
for travelers mistakenly or inequitably selected for secondary screen-
ing.97 Finally, TSA proposed employing a passenger advocate to whom
passengers could turn if they were unfairly flagged for heightened secur-
ity treatment. After providing public notice and entering into a multi-
million-dollar contract with IBM, TSA began testing Secure Flight by
collecting historical passenger information and comparing that informa-
tion with commercial data. This comparison was an attempt to resolve
false positive matches against TSDB records.98
To test Secure Flight, TSA ordered more than seventy domestic
airlines to submit PNRs for the month of June 2004. The data that TSA
requested "varie[d] from airline to airline. . . . It may also [have]
include[d] the names of others traveling in the same party, meal prefer-
ence, whether the reservation was changed, the method of payment and
comments of all types by airline employees on matters like whether a
passenger was drunk or belligerent."9 9 Thus, where
CAPPS II... required the airlines to turn over only passenger names,
dates of birth, home addresses and home telephone numbers[, Secure
96. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER'S EFFORTS TO
SUPPORT THE SECURE FLIGHT PROGRAM i-iX (2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/aO534/
final.pdf.
97. David Hughes, 'Secure Flight' Draws Fire: Privacy Advocates Fear the U.S. Security
Bureaucracy Will Trample Individual Rights, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 1, 2004, at 54
(quoting Justin Oberman, Director of TSA's Office of National Risk Assessment, in connection
with a "very robust redress policy" that will give the public the ability to come in and appeal to the
passenger advocate).
98. See Leslie Miller, Multimillion -dollar Anti-Terror Identity Checks Failing Tests, DAILY
BREEZE (Torrance, Cal.), Oct. 26, 2006, at Al 1.
99. Matthew L. Wald, U.S. Airlines Forced To Give Data on Travelers; For Antiterror
Screen, Government Wants Name, Numbers, Meals, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 23, 2004, at 1.
Secure Flight was not designed to apply to foreign airlines, yet the names of European passengers
who flew on U.S. airlines probably were among those tested. In its testing phase, therefore,
Secure Flight may have violated European privacy laws. See Steve Boggan, Privacy: The New
Security Alert, TIMES (London), Oct. 14, 2003, at 6; Leslie Miller, Flier ID Test Stirs Privacy
Fears: Security Check Exercise Requires Passenger Records, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 20, 2004, at
A25; see also infra Part III.D.
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Flight mandate[d] that the airlines provide the security agency with
passenger name records for each traveler--a document that contains
39 fields of information ranging from a passenger's history of select-
ing pre-reserved seats to the identity of traveling companions."
This prompted privacy advocates to contend Secure Flight was more
invasive than CAPPS 11.101
In fact, Secure Flight generated the type of constitutionally based
opposition that defeated the CAPPS II program.1"2 Citizens themselves
expressed mixed opinions about Secure Flight, including whether and
how it would avoid or remedy circumstances of identity theft. 103 Mean-
while, through a request under the Freedom of Information Act, the
Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC"), a Washington D.C.-
based public interest group, demanded that TSA produce documents
explaining how or if the FBI intended to protect the privacy of travelers
100. Jon Hilkevitch, Privacy Fears Dog Terror Screen; Foes: New System Is More Intrusive,
CHI. TRiB., Sept. 22, 2004, at 13; see also Leslie Miller, Feds Criticized for Ordering Airlines To
Provide Traveler Data, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 14, 2004, at 23 ("The lists are 'a
hodgepodge of information, accurate and inaccurate,' [an ACLU lawyer] said. 'They're the
basement of the program, and the floor is rotten.'"); USA To Test Screening Programme, FLIGHT
INT'L (London), Aug. 31, 2004, at 8 ("[Alccording to [a] TSA administrator, 'Secure Flight differs
from earlier proposed systems by focusing efforts on looking for known or suspected terrorists,
rather than using it for other law-enforcement purposes.'").
101. Scannell, supra note 94, at 12A ("The TSA wants these 54 million records-which
include everything from credit card numbers to whether a kosher meal was requested-to test
Secure Flight, a revised version of a discredited proposal for a passenger profiling system, known
as CAPPS II. The TSA does not deserve our trust.").
102. See, e.g., Leigh A. Kite, Note, Red Flagging Civil Liberties and Due Process Rights in
Airline Passengers: Will a Redesigned CAPPS H System Meet the Constitutional Challenge?, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1385, 1392 (2004). For more information on the changes between CAPPS
II and Secure Flight, see Stephen W. Dummer, Comment, Secure Flight and Data Veillance, a
New Type of Civil Liberties Erosion: Stripping Your Rights When You Don't Even Know It, 75
Miss. L.J. 583, 590 (2006).
103. See All for It-And Completely Opposed, Am SAFETY WK., Oct. 11, 2004; see also
Jennifer Babson, False Alarm Diverts Delta Flight, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 27, 2004, at lB
(reporting diversion of 132-passenger flight from Colombia to Atlanta after the name of a
passenger who was the victim of identity theft was mistakenly thought to be someone on a federal
security watch list); Editorial, No-Fly List Belongs in the Wastebasket, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Nov. 11, 2007, at 2P ("A list that can't distinguish between the real Robert Johnson and all the
others isn't worth much. What makes these lists even more questionable is that some of the most
dangerous terrorist suspects are not on them because intelligence agencies don't want to reveal
their names."); Unsecureflight.com, http://www.unsecureflight.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
Consider also this exchange on National Public Radio between a private citizen (referred to in the
following dialogue as "Caller") and Mark Hatfield, TSA Director of Communications and Public
Information (referred to in the following dialogue as "TSA"):
[CALLER]: ... I have been stopped 22 different times by the TSA, the FBI and the
Secret Service. My name is similar to that of another person in
Chicago, Illinois, who is apparently a financier for al-Qaeda. I have
done everything possible to keep this from happening, and wanted to
know if there's any advice you might be able to give me to get my name
or my comparison name off this list.
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in the course of maintaining records in terrorist screening databases. 10'
EPIC's specific critique was that profiling systems such as Secure Flight
would deny airline passengers any judicially enforceable rights:
Like its [CAPPS] predecessor, Secure Flight has been exempted from
crucial provisions of the Privacy Act, which will severely limit the
rights individuals typically would have in the personal information
the government maintains about them. For instance, Secure Flight
may collect and use personal information irrelevant and unnecessary
for aviation security. Furthermore, passengers will have no judicially
enforceable rights to access and correct the personal information
maintained about them for the program. TSA assures the public,
however, that "upon completion of the testing phase, and before
Secure Flight is operational, TSA will establish comprehensive pas-
senger redress procedures and personal data and civil liberties protec-
tions for the Secure Flight program." No details about these
[TSA]: ... have you contacted the TSA Contact Center and gone through the
process of submitting your name and filling out the form so that we can
take a look at why that might be happening? I can't address what's
causing your experiences with the FBI or the Secret Service, but as far
as the airport security experience, if you're getting selected for
secondary screening or being delayed before you're allowed to board,
we're-we've got the system set up...
[CALLER]: It's beyond secondary screening.... I've been pulled off to the tarmac
in Denver and questioned by two Secret Service agents; a very
embarrassing issue. And, yes, I have been in contact with the TSA and
I've really had no recourse other than to get every frequent-flier card I
can and, again, to go one-on-one with a TSA agent as I'm getting ready
to the board the plane.
[TSA]: . . . Secure Flight is a very clean-focused, well-defined program, and I
think some of the references in that last exchange you had were to the
predecessor, which was CAPPS II, which never really got off the
ground and, in fact, it did grow beyond its original intent as a passenger
prescreening system focused solely on aviation, and I think that was part
of its demise. It just-it started getting attachments and extra features.
It got too heavy to take off ....
Talk of the Nation, supra note 26. In Green v. Transportation Security Administration, airline
passengers sued TSA on the ground that TSA's "maintenance, management, and dissemination of
the No-Fly List was unconstitutional." 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2005); see also
Matthew L. Wald & John Schwartz, Airport Screening Program's Expansion Led to Its Demise,
SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Sept. 20, 2004, at 3A (discussing privacy concerns with the
Secure Flight system).
104. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Transp. Sec. Admin., No. Civ.A. 03-1846 CKK, 2006 WL
626925, at *I (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2002); Sarah Lai Stirland, Public-Interest Group Challenges FBI
over Terrorist Screening, TECH. DAILY, Oct. 18, 2004, available at http://www.govexec.com/
dailyfed/1004/101804tdpml.htm; see also JAYASHRI SRIKANTIAH, ACLU OF N. CAL., THE PUBLIC
STILL LACKS BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE "No FLY" LIST: AN ANALYSIS OF TSA's FOIA
RESPONSE 1 (2003), http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/072103-noflysummary.pdf (discussing the
TSA's response to requests made by the ACLU and two activists whose names were on the No-
Fly list for information about the list).
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protections are available, nor [is] information about how long TSA
will keep the PNR [passenger name record] data that it collects for
Secure Flight, even though the agency intends to launch the program
early next year.
10 5
Despite this criticism, federal efforts to develop Secure Flight proceeded
for four years at an expense in excess of $200 million.
On September 19, 2005 however, Secure Flight was dealt a serious
setback as the Aviation Security Advisory Committee forwarded a
report of a nine-member panel of security and privacy experts-the
Secure Flight Working Group ("SFWG")-to TSA without
recommendation:
The SFWG found that TSA has failed to answer certain key questions
about Secure Flight: First and foremost, TSA has not articulated what
the specific goals of Secure Flight are. Based on the limited test
results presented to us, we cannot assess whether even the general
goal of evaluating passengers for the risk they represent to aviation
security is a realistic or feasible one or how TSA proposes to achieve
it. 106
These and other unresolved concerns about the purpose and architecture
of Secure Flight doomed the program in 2006.107 Nonetheless, DHS
contends that it is working to "reduce mistakes, protect privacy rights
and achieve . . . reliability" in order to release a revamped form of
Secure Flight sometime between 2008 and 2010.108
105. Reactions to Secure Flight, AIR SAFETY WK., Oct. 4, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WLNR
825677 (quoting a September 28, 2004 EPIC statement); see also Michael J. Sniffen, Agency
Admits It Broke Law, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 23, 2006, at 9A ("The Homeland Security Department
admitted ... it violated the Privacy Act two years ago by obtaining more commercial data about
U.S. airline passengers than it had announced it would.... But the privacy office still couldn't
bring itself to use the word 'violate.' Instead, the privacy office said, 'TSA announced one testing
program, but conducted an entirely different one.').
106. SECURE FLIGHT WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE SECURE FLIGHT WORKING GROUP 5
(2005), http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/sfwg-reportL091905.pdf; see also U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AVIATION SECURITY: MEASURES FOR TESTING THE IMPACT OF USING
COMMERCIAL DATA FOR THE SECURE FLIGHT PROGRAM, GAO-05-324 (2005), available at http:II
www.gao.gov/new.items/d05324.pdf (reporting results of GAO's review of measures developed
by TSA to assess the effect of using commercial on aviation security); U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AVIATION SECURITY: SECURE FLIGHT DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
UNDER WAY, BUT RISKS SHOULD BE MANAGED AS SYSTEM Is FURTHER DEVELOPED GAO-05-356
(2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05356.pdf (addressing the status,
effectiveness, and impact on passengers and passenger rights associated with the Secure Flight
program).
107. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AVIATION SECURITY: SIGNIFICANT
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES MAY ADVERSELY AFFECT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S SECURE FLIGHT PROGRAM, GAO-06-374T 4-8 (2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06374t.pdf.
108. Eric Lipton, U.S. Official Admits to Big Delay in Revamping No-Fly Program, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2007, at A17; Wait 'Til Next, Next Year, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 22,
2007, at 23.
[Vol. 62:1
IS AIRLINE PASSENGER PROFILING NECESSARY?
D. Biometrics and the Registered Traveler Program
Part of the controversy surrounding security programs like CAPPS,
CAPPS H, and Secure Flight centered on their involuntary nature. But
privatized efforts are also underway to develop profiling systems that
operate on a voluntary basis, following a Congressional directive to
develop advanced biometric technology applications for aviation secur-
ity.1"9 The product of this mandate is the "Registered Traveler"
program. "'
The Registered Traveler program is a federal credentialing effort
that invites passengers to consent to profiling by volunteering their bio-
graphical and biometric data for essentially low level federal security
clearance. Initially tested at five airports,"' Registered Traveler offers
an exchange with airline passengers: a biometric-encoded pass card or
"smart card" for biographical information, fingerprints, iris images, and
a membership fee."12 After also undergoing a security threat assess-
109. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 44903 (West 2007); David Hughes, New Direction in Screening,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 21, 2006, at 57; see also The Promise of Registered Traveler
Part I and H: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
Cybersecurity of the Comm. on Homeland Security House of Representatives, 109th Cong. 32
(2005) (addressing whether the Registered Traveler Program enhances security and promotes
efficiency in airport screening operations); Implementation of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act with a Focus on the 60-Day Deadline for Screening Checked Baggage: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 107th Cong.
(2002) (discussing baggage screening measures).
110. See generally TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., REGISTERED TRAVELER PROGRAM BUSINESS MODEL
(2006), http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/rt.business-model.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
AVIATION SECURITY: REGISTERED TRAVELER PROGRAM POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES,
GAO-03-253, at 1, 29-30 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03253.pdf; Mardi
Ruth Thompson & Kapila Juthani, Providing Smarter Security and Customer Service: TSA's
Secure Flight and Registered Traveler Programs, 19 AIR & SPACE LAW. 8, 10 (2005) (explaining
the purpose and characteristics of both the Secure Flight and Registered Traveler Programs).
11l. The Registered Traveler Program was tested for fourteen months at airports in
Washington, D.C., Boston, Houston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis. Greenemeier, supra note 68,
at 1; see also British Airways Has Agreed, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 4, 2006, at 18
(noting that British Airways was the first airline to join the Registered Traveler Program). That
different airports may facilitate Registered Traveler programs has led to the creation of a coalition
of ten to twenty airports throughout the United States whose goal is a national, interoperable
system to allow for compatibility among private providers of the Registered Traveler program.
See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE REGISTERED
TRAVELER INTEROPERABiLrrY PILOT 2 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
privacy/privacy-pia-tsa -rt.pdf.
112. See Eric P. Haas, Comment, Back to the Future? The Use of Biometrics, Its Impact on
Airport Security, and How This Technology Should Be Governed, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 459, 478
(2004). See generally John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the
Concerns-Drafting the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. Prrr. L. REV. 97 (1997), for a treatment of
government use of biometrics, and Greg Star, Comment, Airport Security Technology: Is the Use
of Biometric Identification Technology Valid Under the Fourth Amendment?, 20 TEMP. ENVnt. L.
& TECH. J. 251 (2002), for a discussion of the use of biometrics in accordance with the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act and the Fourth Amendment.
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ment, registered or "Trusted Travelers" with smart cards are able to cut
waiting time by bypassing standard airport screening processes to a spe-
cial security screening lane. 11
3
Registered Traveler is chiefly a private undertaking. TSA performs
a limited, inherently governmental and facilitating role such as providing
security threat assessment for adjudication and program oversight, as
well as conducting physical screening at TSA checkpoints. 1 4 Mean-
while, private service providers at sponsoring airports administer Regis-
tered Traveler.115 Verified Identity Pass, a New York company led by
the founder of CourtTV, is one of four private service providers for Reg-
istered Traveler through a program called "Clear."' 1 6 Available through
the Internet or in person at temporary cubicles in selected airports,
"Clear" allows passengers to obtain a "clear card" by filling out an
application, paying a membership fee (of which $28 is a TSA enrollment
fee), and providing credentialing information, e.g., driver's license num-
ber, previous home address, and social security number." 7 In an open
113. See Stephen Majors, Passengers Skip Line-For a Price, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 6, 2007, at
1C.
114. See Transp. Sec. Admin., Registered Traveler, http://www.tsa.gov/what-we-do/layers/rt/
index.shtm (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
115. See id.
116. See Edward Hasbrouck, Mr. Brill Builds His Own Airline Screening Service, PRIVACY J.,
Oct. 2005, at 1; see also Paul Hoversten, TSA Sets June 20 as Launch Date for Nationwide
Registered Traveler Program, HOMELAND SECURITY & DEF., Nov. 9, 2005, at I (" 'It is hard to
imagine that the government could offer the efficiency, customer service, incentives for continual
innovation, and privacy protections that a robustly competitive private sector industry could
provide,' [Steven Brill] said."). There are three other TSA-approved service providers in addition
to Verified Identity Pass: Unisys Corporation of Reston, Virginia, Verant Identification Systems,
Inc. of Rochester, New York, and Vigilant Solutions of Jacksonville, Florida.
117. Carol Pucci, Travelers Weigh Benefits of New Security Program, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 29,
2006, at J1; see also Thomas Frank, TSA: Program May Use Fliers' Financial Data, USA
TODAY, Jan. 23, 2006, at 3A (reporting that Verified Identity Pass experimented with giving
applicants quizzes generated by commercial data to authenticate their identity, but some questions
were either too difficult, such as the year someone received their social security number, or so
easy that "'a terrorist . .. could pass the quiz on behalf of any person'"). DHS requires
sponsoring entities and service providers of the Registered Traveler program to furnish Registered
Traveler applicants with a written "TSA Privacy Statement" at the time of application, stating in
part:
Routine Uses. The information will be used by and disclosed to TSA personnel and
contractors or other agents who need the information to assist in the operation of the
Registered Traveler program. Additionally, TSA may share this information with
airports and airlines to the extent necessary to ensure proper identification, ticketing,
security screening and boarding of Registered Travelers. TSA may disclose
information to appropriate law enforcement or other government agencies as
necessary to identify and respond to outstanding criminal warrants or potential
threats to transportation security.
TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., TSA REGISTERED TRAVELER: SECURITY, PRIVACY AND COMPLIANCE
STANDARDS FOR SPONSORlIO ENTITIES AND SERVICE PROVIDERS § 3.4.5, at 27 (2007), available at
http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/rt-standards-v3-0.pdf.
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letter, the CEO of Verified Identity Pass introduced "Clear" by acknowl-
edging the tension between national security and personal privacy with
which even voluntary profiling systems contend:
In the post 9-11 era we have to take new measures to protect our-
selves yet not destroy our way of life by strangling the free flow of
people and commerce. Somehow, we have to find common sense
solutions that don't make everyone a suspect and create security bot-
tlenecks everywhere we go. To be blunt, that means we need a fair,
sensible way not to treat everyone the same when it comes to terror-
ism protection.
[W]e think we have a special responsibility to protect your privacy.
Yes, we are using biometric identifiers such as fingerprints and iris
images. Yes, your enrollment application will be submitted to the
government for a basic security threat assessment before we can issue
you a Clear card. But we do not believe the process and the ques-
tions stop there. We know that this kind of new idea and new process
is bound to make many people uneasy about what we are doing with
their personal information, especially at a time when every day seems
to bring new headlines about identity theft .... [W]e've made our-
selves strictly and publicly accountable for keeping them." 8
Though consumer-friendly and relatively transparent when com-
pared to CAPPS, CAPPS II, and Secure Flight, the Registered Traveler
program has been criticized as involving an unwarranted invasion of pri-
vacy. Specifically, the ACLU has argued that the supposed benefits of
Registered Traveler do not justify the important privacy rights that air-
line passengers must forgo merely to obtain the status of "Trusted Trav-
eler."1 9 Additionally, critics of the Registered Traveler program note
that it creates two classes of airline passengers, those who can afford the
label of "Trusted Traveler" and those who cannot: "[T]he system would
give special treatment to people based on their ability to pay [and while]
some travelers buy extra services .... the issue here is security, not extra
leg room or an in-flight meal."' 20 Finally, the ACLU has suggested that
118. Steven Brill, A Message from Clear's CEO, Steven Brill, http://www.flyclear.com/clear_
ceosmessage.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
119. See Jeffrey Leib,"What Happened to the Benefits?" Says Travel Group, DENVER POST,
Jan. 22, 2006, at C-01; see also Leslie Miller, TSA Toughens Registered Traveler Rules, WASH.
POST, Jan. 21, 2006, at All (reporting that companies selling Registered Traveler cards must
demonstrate whether "applicants are members of terrorist sleeper cells by plowing through bank
records, insurance data and other personal information available commercially-or by some other
method").
120. Editorial, Cutting Corners at Airports; Plans for Speeding Up Security Checks Are
Troubling, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Nov. 12, 2005, at A24. Contra Editorial, How Much Would
You Pay To Skip Airport Security Lines?, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Maine), Nov. 8, 2005, at
A10 ("[T]he ACLU is off base [because] these registered travelers will be voluntarily submitting
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the Registered Traveler program may destabilize existing anti-terrorism
programs by enabling terrorist leaders to find out if their operatives are
on the terrorist watch lists against which Registered Travelers are com-
pared.1 2' As one critic contended, "[m]embers of a terrorist sleeper cell
could obtain false identification and become registered travelers, using
the lessened security screening to evade detection and commit a terrorist
act." 
122
Aside from operation concerns, Registered Traveler is attractive to
business interests. Business travelers have embraced Registered Trav-
eler for making airline travel less burdensome. Private vendors like Ver-
ified Identity Pass, too, have profited by partnering with airports to
receive a cut of the annual fee collected from Trusted Travelers. Air-
ports, in turn, see marketing and customer service opportunities in Reg-
istered Traveler. Airport authorities at Logan International Airport in
Boston, Massachusetts, for example, have stimulated interest in the Reg-
istered Traveler program by giving "Trusted Travelers" discounts on air-
port parking and dining.' 2 3 Such business opportunities have raised the
question whether Registered Traveler is more of a revenue scheme than
an anti-terrorism device.
TSA had planned to roll out Registered Traveler nationally in 2007,
with approximately twenty airports participating in the program by
2008. By mid-2007, however, the future of the Registered Traveler pro-
their information and fingerprints. As for the apparent privilege of buying convenience-it's no
different than the longstanding and widely accepted system of offering first-class and coach fares
by most airlines."); Editorial, Screening Plan Makes Sense, KANSAS CrrY STAR, Nov. 8, 2005
("[T]he ACLU . . . voiced concerns that participants would have to give too much personal
information, and many would be unable to afford the fee.... [But w]ithout personal information,
no background check can be thorough. And participation is voluntary.").
121. Dirty Socks? Enplane in the Fast Lane; Program in Works Will Let Frequent Fliers Pay
for a Card That's a Bit like E-ZPass, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Jan. 21, 2006, at Al
("[The] chief technology officer of Computerpane Internet Security, Inc. said [that the Registered
Traveler Program was] an easy way to test if your potential mission-goers have themselves on the
list .. "); see also Paul Hudson, Aviation Security Headed in Wrong Direction, AIR & SPACE
LAW., Summer 2002, at 6, 7 ("A smart card issued to certain frequent flyers is reverse or positive
profiling, and profiling has generally been a failure in aviation security, particularly when used for
antihijacking security."); Traci Watson, U.S. Looks at Which Tech Proposals Will Fly, USA
TODAY, Nov. 26, 2001, at 4A (" 'Seventeen of the nineteen Sept. 11 terrorists were ordinary, law-
abiding citizens until after they were on the planes,' says James Wayman, director of the National
Biometrics Test Center at San Jose State University. 'They had Social Security cards and
frequent-flier numbers. How could any biometric device have stopped them?' ").
122. Jay Boehmer, Trusted Traveler To Fly, Bus. TRAVEL NEWS, Nov. 14, 2005, at 1, 32
("When asked to make sure that nobody in the Registered Traveler program is a terrorist, [Tom
Ridge, the first secretary of DHS], said, 'Candidly, there is no guarantee. But as you manage that
risk, you also have to realize that, in a post-9/11 world, it is very unlikely a group of people can
take over an airplane and turn it into a missile.' ").
123. See Peter J. Howe, Logan To Start Express Security Program This Summer, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 20, 2006, at Al.
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gram was uncertain. In August 2007 Senator Mel Martinez (R-Fla.) suc-
cessfully proposed to authorize DHS to follow the lead of Canada,
Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom by creating an
international registered traveler program. 12 4 At the same time, however,
TSA Administrator Kip Hawley insisted that the Registered Traveler
program "was not a security program" and that, "[a]fter prioritizing our
security initiatives based on risk, TSA decided that taxpayers' resources
are best applied to more critical needs." 2 '
III. DISCUSSION
As the fifth anniversary of September 11 approached, Americans
considered whether commercial airline security had improved since
2001.126 The unsuccessful August 10, 2006 terrorist plot to detonate
liquid explosives aboard international airplanes bound for the United
States offered a somber perspective. 127 The two week period following
that attempt was discouraging also. During that period, approximately
twenty-five "security incidents" occurred at airports and nine commer-
cial airplanes were diverted from their intended destinations.1 28 Some
jetliners were escorted to the ground by fighter planes. 129 These "inci-
dents" suggested that crises had become a regular feature of worldwide
commercial airline travel after September 11.
On August 25, 2006 alone, seven commercial flights were reported
disrupted. 3 ° A Continental Airlines flight from Buenos Aires, Argen-
tina was delayed at its planned stopover in Houston, Texas when a col-
lege student aboard the airplane was detained for packing dynamite in
his checked luggage. 13 1 An American Airlines flight from Manchester,
124. Senate Approves Sen. Martinez Amendment Creating International Registered Traveler
Program, U.S. FED. NEWS, July 27, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 14485361.
125. Otto Kreisher, Frustration Raised over Registered Traveler Program Delays, CONGRESS
DAILY, Aug. 1, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 14694614 (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 19, at 383 ("[Allthough Americans may be safer, they are
not safe.").
127. See Jessica E. Vascellaro, Air Safety: What Has and Hasn't Changed, WALL ST. J., Aug.
19, 2006, at A9 ("'If last week's foiled terror plot was not a wake-up call to jump-start our
screening technology, then I don't know what is,' [Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) stated].").
128. See, e.g., NBC Nightly News with Brian Williams: Nine Flights Grounded amid Security
Concerns (NBC television broadcast Aug. 25, 2006).
129. See id. Notwithstanding official statements to the contrary, some Americans believe one
of the four airplanes hijacked on September 11, 2001 was shot down by U.S. military fighters.
See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 19, at 40-46. See generally Kay Hailbronner, Freedom of the Air
and the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 490, 514 (1983) ("[Internationally,]
[e]ven if an order to land is deliberately disregarded, a civil unarmed aircraft that intrudes into
foreign airspace may not be fired upon.").
130. See Elizabeth Mehren, 7 Incidents in a Day Show Air Travel Anxiety Is Up, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2006, at A .
131. FBI: Dynamite Found in Luggage, CNN.coM, Aug. 25, 2006, http://www.cnn.comI2006/
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England to Chicago, Illinois was forced to land in Bangor, Maine at a
former military base because of an unspecified threat. 132  A U.S. Air-
ways jet destined for Charlotte, North Carolina from Phoenix, Arizona
made an emergency landing in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma after federal
air marshals tackled and subdued a disruptive passenger who had pushed
a flight attendant.133 A Corpus Christi, Texas to Bakersfield, California
Continental Airlines flight was held at its scheduled stop in El Paso,
Texas after a missing lavatory panel was discovered.134 A utility knife
was discovered on an empty passenger seat of a Pennsylvania to Con-
necticut U.S. Airways flight.' 35 An Aer Lingus flight originating in
New York was evacuated during a scheduled stopover in western Ireland
following an unfounded bomb threat.' 36 Finally, a United Airlines flight
bound for LaGuardia Airport in New York from Chicago, Illinois was
evacuated and delayed when a ten-year-old boy falsely announced that
he had a bomb strapped to his leg.' 37
These scares were caused by people with bad intentions or bad
judgment, not merely by objects like bombs and knives. That a ten-
year-old boy could cause an evacuation of an airplane of a hundred or
more passengers aptly illustrates the challenge confronting aviation
security officials. Aeosop's fable of a boy who falsely cried wolf so
often that he lost credibility within his community has little application
to the commercial aviation industry. 138 Authorities responsible for avia-
tion security must assume the worst and entertain both credible and
incredible threats at any time, every time. 139 Terrorism is asymmetrical
US/08/25/dynamite.plane/index.html ("The passenger said he had been exploring mines in Bolivia
and purchased the dynamite as a souvenir .... ).
132. Id.; see also NBC Nightly News with Brian Williams, supra note 128.
133. FBI: Dynamite Found in Luggage, supra note 131.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. NBC Nightly News with Brian Williams, supra note 128.
138. The government's own credibility is at stake in its creation and enforcement of aviation
security policy. For example, TSA publicizes that "[a]irlines can and should automatically de-
select any 8-year-olds out there that appear to be on a watch list. Whether you're eight or 80, the
most common occurrence is name confusion and individuals are told they are on the no fly list
when in fact, they are not." Myth Busters: The "No Fly" List Includes an 8-Year Old Boy, http://
www.tsa.gov/approach/mythbusters/8yo-noflylist.shtm (last visited Oct. 13, 2007). Yet, stories of
children on watch lists persist. See, e.g., Ken Kaye, Coral Springs Boy, 7, on No-Fly List Has
Been Delayed at Airport Three Times, S. FLA. SUN-SENTNEL, July 24, 2007, at IA (reporting that
7-year-old Michael Martin had been denied boarding on multiple occasions since September 11,
2001 presumably because he shares the name of an Irish terrorist who was convicted in an
Arizona smuggling ring that attempted to ship bomb detonators to the Irish Republican Army); see
also supra notes 26 and 103 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., CNN Newsroom: National Intelligence Report on Terrorist Threat Released
(CNN television broadcast July 17, 2007) ("We cannot know the enemy's calculation, nor when it
will shift. We prepare for and anticipate both, with the realization that the enemy only has to be
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in this respect, and the fact terrorists need to be successful only once to
achieve disaster has become a central tenet of the doctrine of preemption
that dominates U.S. foreign policy under President George W. Bush and
Vice President Dick Cheney." Profiling airline passengers may help to
right this acute imbalance. As detailed below, however, whether certain
civil liberties should be negotiated or trumped in the name of national
security and airline safety is debatable, particularly as government sur-
veillance, domestic wiretapping, and eavesdropping programs are a
source of contemporary public concern. 1 '
A. Identifying the Enemy
The initial questions borne of September 11 were "What hap-
pened?" and "Who did this?" These questions are resolved. 142 The
more difficult questions of who is a terrorist and what, if anything, can
be done to identify and preempt future perpetrators remain unanswered.
To resolve these questions, federal aviation security policy makers who
favor profiling airline passengers assume terrorists have identifiable
characteristics or behavioral patterns that are different from other airline
passengers. Profiling systems are sensible in this context because they
distinguish "them" from "us" and "good" from "bad," collecting as
much information as possible about terrorists who move secretly among
law-abiding airline passengers. Ironically, in the course of rooting out
the proverbial enemy among us, the federal government's investigative
energies are directed internally to "us" and thus threaten the bundle of
travel rights that exist in the United States enjoy. 4 3
right once, while we must be right every day, all the time[, stated Fran Townsend, Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.]"); see also Motivation and Aviation as a
Terrorism Target, IBPPONLINE, Nov. 5, 2003, http://security.pr.erau.edu/read.php?kind=html&
articlevolume= 15&article-issue= 10&articlejtitle=Motivation%20and%20Aviation%2Oas%20a
%20Terrorism%2OTarget ("Unfortunately, aviation terrorism is an activity with a huge terrorist
advantage-with terrorists picking their spots while security authorities maintain continuous
vigilance; with even operationally unsuccessful terrorist operations achieving at least some
psychopolitical success through raising anxiety, distrust in leaders, and pressure towards visible
and concurrently ineffective programs among population segments who believe that they are or
might be under attack.").
140. See RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA'S PURSUIT OF ITS
ENEMIES SINCE 9/11, at 62 (2006).
141. See Bob Barr, Post-9/1l Electronic Surveillance Severely Undermining Freedom, 41
VAL. U. L. Rav. 1383, 1383-85 (2007); Bennie G. Thompson, The National Counterterrorism
Center: Foreign and Domestic Intelligence Fusion and the Potential Threat to Privacy, 10 PGH.
J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 1 (2006).
142. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 19, at 1-14; see also Brian M. Jenkins, The Organization
Men: Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack, in How DID THIS HAPPEN? TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR
1-14 (James F. Hoge, Jr. & Gideon Rose eds., 2001).
143. In Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that
[t]he right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen cannot be deprived
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
That CAPPS identified a majority of the September 11 terrorists
may justify profiling and a corresponding infringement of some existing
travel and privacy rights. After all, CAPPS effectively identified
"them." That is, ten of the nineteen hijackers were identified by then
operational profiling systems. That the consequence of being identified
was minimal for the terrorists is another matter. The terrorists' baggage
was detained until the terrorists themselves boarded the doomed air-
planes. This represents a defect in enforcement, not profiling. By con-
centrating on bombs instead of people, security officials failed to use
profiling systems effectively. But, within a week after September 11,
government officials began to talk more about observation of passengers
as an important layer of aviation security."4 As a result, a corps of
"behavior detection officers" has evolved among TSA's approximately
43,000 screeners in a program called "Screening Passengers by Observa-
tion Technique" ("SPOT").145 Success of this program is critical if com-
mercial aviation security policy is to get beyond "the culture of
contraband."' 146
For years Israeli aviation security officials have focused on airline
without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.... [D]eeply engrained in
our history [is] this freedom of movement ... [a]cross frontiers in either direction,
and inside frontiers.... Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values.
The modem right to travel may have originated in clause 42 of the Magna Carta:
It shall be lawful in future for anyone, without prejudicing the allegiance due to us,
to leave our kingdom and return safely and securely by land and water, save, in the
public interest, for a short period in time of war-except for those imprisoned or
outlawed in accordance with the law of the kingdom and natives of a land that is at
war with us and merchants (who shall be treated as aforesaid).
Magna Carta, cl. 42 (1215), reprinted in RALPH V. TURNER, MAGNA CARTA: THROUGH THE AGES
231-32 (2003); see also Heather E. Reser, Comment, Airline Terrorism: The Effect of Tightened
Security on the Right To Travel, 63 J. AIR L. & CoM. 819, 821 (1998) (arguing that increased
security and travel restrictions interfere with the right to travel). Contra Tracey Maclin, The
Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
1258 (1990). Although "Americans have enjoyed the freedom to walk the streets and move about
the country free from unreasonable government intrusion for many years[,]" id. at 1260, "not all
Americans have been able to move freely about the country. In many parts of colonial America,
both North and South, Negroes were required to carry 'passes.'" Id. at 1260 n.4 (emphasis in
original).
144. See David Armstrong & Joseph Pereira, Flight Risks: Nation's Airlines Adopt Aggressive
Measures for Passenger Profiling, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2001, at Al; Paul Nyhan, Airlines Will
Be Watching for Nervous Passengers, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 14, 2001, at A3.
145. See Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., TSA Designs and Tests Curriculum To Train
Police Officers To Spot Terrorist-Related Activity (Apr. 6, 2006), available at http://www.tsa.
gov/press/releases/2006/pressrelease_0655.shtm; Denise Lavoie, Lawsuit Challenges Profiling at
Airports, ASSOCIATED PREss, Dec. 3, 2007, WL 12/3/07 APONLINEUS 22:48:54; Eric Lipton,
Faces, Too, Are Searched as U.S. Airports Try To Spot Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2006, at
Al; Laura Meckler & Daniel Michaels, Airline Terror Plot: Aircraft-Security Focus Swings to
People, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2006, at A4.
146. Editorial, Airport Security; Hair Gels, Lipstick and Terrorism, WASH. POST, Aug. 20,
2006, at B6.
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passengers themselves. They screen passengers individually and per-
sonally in a process taking hours per person.147 The United States has
not had to cope with the pervasive terrorism that threatens Israel, and
intentionally time-consuming airline passenger profiling is neither a
standard nor a welcomed feature in the United States. But it appears to
be effective. 48 In 1986, for example, a pregnant woman on a London-
to-Tel Aviv flight was pulled aside by El Al for further screening.
Security officials were suspicious of a pregnant woman traveling alone.
In fact, unbeknownst to the passenger, her Jordanian boyfriend had
planted a bomb in her carry-on luggage that would have killed the 375
people on her flight. 14 9 As a result of security processes like these, no
successful hijackings have ever occurred out of an Israeli airport.151
Behavioral profiling has flaws, though. "Learning to defeat poorly
trained screeners is a lot easier than learning to fly a jumbo jet[,] ' 51 and
the occurrence of "false positives" may be higher where human beings
are responsible for profiling. Indeed, where a computer might generate
a false positive because it is insensitive to details outside of its protocol,
observation-based profiling involves a subjective, perhaps discrimina-
tory determination that may confuse quirky passengers for terrorists.
Naturally, not every passenger who is anxious about flying, with sweaty
palms and nervous movements, is a terrorist.'52
147. See Larry Derfner, Stereotyping Security, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 23, 2007, at 14.
148. Cf. id. ("'I sort of got the feeling at certain airports that [improper treatment of Arab or
gentile passengers] wasn't frowned upon, that what was important was that the planes left on time
and didn't blow up,' [said a former Israeli airport security screener who supports airline passenger
profiling.]").
149. See Daniel Brook, Profiling's Gender Gap: If a Woman Can Do Anything a Man Can Do,
Doesn't That Include Terrorism?, LEGAL AF'., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 44 (describing the DOJ's post-
September 11, 2001 National Security Entry Exit Registration System that was designed to require
visa holders from 24 Muslim countries (and North Korea) to register with the U.S. Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services; it applied only to men); Lowry, supra note 48, at 32 ("It is
inarguable that sensitivity about profiling in the U.S. made the September Il hijackers' job easier.
Their plot would have simply been a non-starter in Israel. There, passengers are divided into three
categories: Israelis and foreign Jews, non-Jewish foreigners, and anyone with an Arab name.
Those in third category get lots of special attention .... ").
150. Bernard E. Harcourt, Search and Defend, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006, at A21 ("Israelis
recruit their officers mostly from the military, subject them to stringent tests ... and give them
nine weeks of training in behavior recognition. This is a far cry from the T.S.A.'s program:
recruits are routine screeners, required only to have a high school degree and a criminal
background check; they are given four days of classroom training in observation and questioning
techniques, three days of field practice, then sent out on the job.").
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Sedigh v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 197, 198-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); see
also Editorial, Clerics' Lawsuit Threatens Security of All Passengers, USA TODAY, Mar. 27,
2007, at 19A ("[Slix Muslim clerics, returning from a religious conference in Minneapolis, were
removed from a US Airways flight after passengers and crew raised alarms .... The six say they
are innocent victims of ethnic profiling for merely praying quietly in Arabic at the terminal ....
Suing passengers who merely report such behavior threatens everyone's ability to travel
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Scholarship suggests that behavioral profiling may be impossible,
not simply error-prone like computer programs. Profiling is based on
the presumption that individuals who become involved in global terror-
ism share features. Terrorists may have common social backgrounds or
common psychological make-up.' 53 Additionally, individuals drawn to
terrorism may have been recruited because of common situations.' 54 A
January 2007 study by Professor Edwin Bakker of the Netherlands
Clingendael Institute of International Relations showed that most of 242
Islamic radicals who were convicted or accused of planning terrorist
attacks in Europe from 2001 to 2006 were men of Arab descent who had
been born and raised in Europe and came from lower or middle-class
backgrounds.' They ranged from sixteen to fifty-nine years of age at
the time of arrest (the average was twenty-seven years old) and about
one in four had a criminal record. 5 6 Still, identifying terrorists beyond
these demographics proves problematic.
More attention should be devoted to understanding the personal
experiences that motivate people to become radicals. For example,
Dutch researchers claim that one reason why more young women are
becoming involved in radical networks in the Netherlands is that they
come under the influence of "Moroccan lover boys," "charismatic
Romeos who manipulate emotionally needy women into committing
criminal acts."' 57  Meanwhile, the social background of the Salafi
mujahedin, for example-their geographical origins, 58 socioeconomic
status, 159 education, faith as youth, and occupation-debunk common
stereotypes of terrorists. Often, members of the Salafi mujahedin
enjoyed a modern education, became devout before joining the jihad,
and were not hardened criminals. 160
securely."); Libby Sander, 6 Imams Removed from Flight for Behavior Deemed Suspicious, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2006, at A18 (noting that the incident involving the Muslim clerics spurred
claims of racial profiling and stereotyping).
153. SAGEMAN, supra note 6, at 69.
154. Id.
155. Summary of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe, Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in
Which They Joined the Jihad: An Exploratory Study, http://www.clingendael.nl/cscp/publications/
?publications/?id=6480&&type=summary; Whitlock, supra note 6, at Al.
156. Whitlock, supra note 6, at Al.
157. Id.
158. SAGEMAN, supra note 6, at 70 ("[A]bout two-thirds of the 172 mujahedin in the sample
come from Saudi Arabia (31), Egypt (24), France (18), Algeria (15), Morocco (14), and Indonesia
(12).").
159. Id. at 73-74 ("[A]bout three-fourths [of 102 people on whom data was gathered] of global
Salafi mujahedin were solidly upper or middle class, refuting the argument that terrorism arises
from poverty.").
160. Id. at 96 ("Members of the global Salafi jihad were generally middle-class, educated
young men from caring and religious families, who grew up with strong positive values of
religion, spirituality, and concern for their communities."). Additionally, the vast majority of a
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Profiling-whether by computer or person-is further complicated
because theories for identifying terrorists often suffer from a lack of
specificity and corroborative data. In psychological terms, the "personal
pathology thesis" that terrorists suffer from mental illnesses finds little
support. The convenient and comforting theory that terrorists are soci-
opaths and psychopaths or fanatics with overvalued ideas, obsessed like
anorexic people with body dysmorphic disorder, appears to be unsup-
ported.' 61 The thesis that terrorists suffer from pathological narcissism,
paranoia, or an authoritarian personality have found little empirical sup-
port, too.' 6 2 Of a sample of sixty-one "terrorists" about whom some
childhood data existed, only four had evidence of antisocial personality
disorder.163 Two of those individuals were Christian converts, i.e., Jose
Padilla' 64 and Richard Reid. 65  Even the fact that terrorist tactics
involve suicide is explicable in a cultural context of martyrdom rather
than insanity. 66 The social circumstances that have led individuals to
sample of sixty-nine mujahedin described their childhoods in positive or neutral terms-"shy,
introverted, serious, quiet, bright, excellent student, loner, pleasant, easy-going, happy, [and]
gentle." Id. at 85; see also Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Assets of a Bombing Suspect: Keen Wit,
Religious Soul, Angry Temper, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1998, at A6 (describing the life and character
of a suspected terrorist).
161. See SAGEMAN, supra note 6, at 81; see also HERVEY CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY:
AN ATrEMPT To REINTERPRET THE SO-CALLED PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY (1941); MAXWELL
TAYLOR, THE FANATICS: A BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE (1991). Contra
Paul R. McHugh, A Psychiatrist Looks at Terrorism: There's Only One Way To Stop Fanatical
Behavior, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 10, 2001, at 21 (stating that both terrorist behavior and
anorexia nervosa are associated with a passionate attitude, termed an "overvalued idea").
162. SAGEMAN, supra note 6, at 83-91; see also RICHARD M. PEARLSTEIN, THE MIND OP THE
POLITICAL TERRORIST 15-32 (1991) (discussing narcissism and the psychology of the political
terrorist); Jerrold M. Post, Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of
Psychological Forces, in ORIGmS OF TERRORISM 25 (Walter Reich ed., 1990) (noting that no
major psychopathology was revealed in the study of the psychology of terrorists); ROBERT S.
RoBINS & JERROLD M. POST, POLITICAL PARANOIA: THE PSYCHOPOLITICS OF HATRED 103 (1997)
("[M]any drawn to the path of terrorism have a paranoid disposition and find the externalizing
rhetoric attractive."); Salman Akhtar, The Psychodynamic Dimension of Terrorism, 29
PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 350, 351 (1999) ("[E]vidence does exist that most major players in a
terrorist organization are, themselves, deeply traumatized individuals."); Jerrold M. Post,
Hostiliti, Conformiti, Fratemitd: The Group Dynamics of Terrorist Behavior, 36 INT'L J. GROUP
PSYCHOTHERAPHY 211-24 (1986) (discussing the existence of a uniformity in terrorist behavior);
Jerrold M. Post, Narcissism and the Charismatic Leader-Follower Relationship, 7 POL. PSYCHOL.
675-88 (1986); Jerrold M. Post, Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior, 7
TERRORISM: AN INT'L J., 241, 241 (1984) ("Because of the diversity of terrorist groups and
causes, there is 'no one terrorist mindset."'); Andrew Silke, Cheshire-Cat Logic: The Recurring
Theme of Terrorist Abnormality in Psychological Research, 4 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 51, 62-68
(1998) (concluding that psychological evidence indicates that "terrorists are normal people").
163. SAGEMAN, supra note 6, at 81.
164. Id.
165. Pam Belluck, Threats and Response: The Bomb Plot; Unrepentant Shoe Bomber Is Given
a Life Sentence for Trying To Blow Up Jet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003, at A13.
166. E.g., SAGEMAN, supra note 6, at 82-83 ("Like the Japanese kamikaze ...the Salafi
shahada ... legitimizes and encourages the nobility of martyrdom.... Even the Christian Bible
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join jihad, including age, place of recruitment, faith, employment, and
relative deprivation, are multivariable. 167 Consequently, profiling may
be impracticable because, "[iun terms of generating a common profile of
the global Salafi mujahed[, for example], there are as many profiles as
there are clusters of mujahedin."1 68
Finally, apart from questions about the underlying psychophysio-
logical aspects of profiling is the overriding question whether profiling
systems are scientifically reliable as a matter of law. 169 Profiling sys-
tems may be like polygraph machines in that their usefulness to law
enforcement, if any, frequently ends at the courthouse steps as an inad-
missible technique. Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., whether a technique is scientific knowledge is based on several
considerations: whether the technique can be and has been tested,
whether the technique has been subject to peer review, the known or
potential rate of error, and whether the technique used has been gener-
ally accepted.1 70 As has been noted, the criteria constituting an airline
passenger profile are not known publicly and therefore cannot be tested
transparently. In fact, the government's testing of profiling systems in
collaboration with the airline industry led to litigation.171 It is not clear
what peers the closed intelligence community has for purposes of evalu-
ating profiling as a technique. Moreover, profiling is neither a generally
accepted technique nor a process whose error rate is known or satisfac-
tory. 172 Therefore, even presuming that profiling is necessary to safe-
guard commercial aviation, no definite set of characteristics constituting
an airline passenger profile exists to identify the enemy. As the
Supreme Court of Canada stated in the seminal decision R. v. Mohan,
personal opinion about the behavior characteristics of an individual is
recognizes the value of such sacrifice: 'Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down
his life for his friends' (John 16:13)."); see also Ariel Merari, The Readiness To Kill and Die:
Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East, in ORIGINS OF TERRORISM 196-97 (Walter Reich ed.,
1990) (discussing the influence of cultural factors on suicidal terrorism); Robert A. Pape, The
Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 97 AM. POL. Sm. REV. 343, 347 (2003) (noting that suicide
terrorists justify their actions on the basis of the religious and ideological beliefs of a broader
community).
167. SAGEMAN, supra note 6, at 91-96. See generally TED ROBERT GURR, WHY MEN REBEL
(1970) (discussing demographic and sociological factors that lead people to join dissident groups).
168. SAGEMAN, supra note 6, at 98.
169. Interview with Richard W. Bloom, Dean, College of Arts and Sciences & Director,
Terrorism, Intelligence, and Security Studies, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (July 18,
2007) (on file with author).
170. 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
171. See cases cited supra note 89.
172. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil
Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1275, 1275-76 (2004); Yoram Margalioth & Tomer Blumkin, Targeting the Majority:
Redesigning Racial Profiling, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 317, 328 (2006).
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not as valuable as a behavioral profile that is "in common use as a relia-
ble indicator of membership in a distinctive group. Put another way:
Has the scientific community developed a standard profile for the
offender who commits this type of crime?"'173 To date, neither the scien-
tific nor the intelligence community has created such a reliable indicator
of terrorists, and as detailed, it may not be possible to do so.
In all, as Bernard E. Harcourt has argued, society's reliance on pre-
dictive or actuarial methods of allocating enforcement and punishment
should be abandoned in favor of a return to society's "most central intui-
tion of just punishment: the idea that any person committing a criminal
offense should have the same probability of being apprehended as simi-
larly situated offenders." 174  Yet, profiling remains an attractive and
important security option. It offers the chance to locate clues where they
exist. Of course, this begs the question whether the law permits consid-
eration of some clues but not others, such as race, religion, and ethnicity.
B. Is Airline Passenger Profiling Rational or Racist?
Inarguably, profiling requires discrimination. Both "profiling" and
"discrimination" have acquired strong negative connotations. 175  Yet,
profiling and discrimination are common, lawful features of economic
life in America today because of the commoditization of personal infor-
mation. 176 Banks and supermarkets have long used profiling as market-
ing and strategic planning tools.177 Businesses today segment their
173. [19941 2 S.C.R. 9 49 (Can.) (rejecting testimony intended to show that the character
traits of a physician accused of sexually assaulting female patients did not fit the psychological
profile attributable to any of several groups in which most sex offenders fall).
174. Bernard E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN
ACTUARIAL AGE 238 (2007).
175. See Ben Winograd, 'Profiling' Not a Dirty Word in Israel; U.S. Studies Airport Security
There, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), May 10, 2007, at A21; 60 Minutes: That Dirty Little World
"Profiling" (CBS television broadcast Aug. 11, 2002) ("[W]hen it comes to identifying criminals
and terrorists in our politically correct society, profiling has become a dirty word, and there is a
problem drawing the fine line between common sense and bigotry."). Another source notes:
In public discourse, profiling is often viewed as constituting one of four narratives.
On the one hand, it is something that works but whose work should not be allowed.
On the other hand, it is something that should be allowed but may not work. There
are also adherents of two other narratives: that profiling works and should be
allowed to work and that it doesn't work and shouldn't be allowed even if it did.
All four of these narratives may ignore important issues as to the nature, utility, and
ethics of profiling.
Biometric, Psychometric, and Sociometric Profiling, supra note 5.
176. See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort
Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 63, 66-67 (2003); Jeff Sovern, Opting
In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L.
REV. 1033, 1035-42 (1999).
177. See Gram-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (permitting
banks and other financial institutions to share customer data with affiliated companies); Steven A.
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customers on the basis of buying habits and patterns, where repeat cus-
tomers earn benefits such as gift cards or giveaways. Airlines certainly
profile and categorize their customers through computer reservation and
yield management systems, along with frequent flyer reward pro-
grams. 78 In state and federal courts across the nation, lawyers profile
potential jurors during voir dire and doing so is an important part of the
judicial process. Of course, lawyers may only profile potential jurors on
the condition they do not discriminate on the basis of race, color, relig-
ion, sex, national origin, or economic status.17 9 In the marketplace and
in the courtroom, then, profiling can be rational conduct, and discrimina-
tion can entail nothing more than differentiating individuals on permissi-
ble grounds for appropriate ends.
Like profiling and discrimination, the connotation and legitimacy
of surveillance is context based. 80 From its founding, the U.S. govern-
ment has surveilled its own citizens in response to external threats, alter-
natively justifying its actions as either care or control.181 In 1798, for
example, Congress passed the Alien Enemies Act, which allowed Presi-
dent John Adams to deport noncitizens identified as threats to the coun-
Bercu, Smart Card Technology, Novel Privacy Concerns and the Legal Response, 7 J. PROPRIETY
RTS. 2 (1995); Oliver Ireland & Rachel Howell, The Fear Factor: Privacy, Fear, and the
Changing Hegemony of the American People and the Right to Privacy, 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 671, 673-74 (2004); Janet Dean Gertz, Comment, The Purloined Personality:
Consumer Profiling in Financial Services, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 943, 960-63 (2002); Allison
Kidd, Recent Development, A Penny Saved, A Lifestyle Learned? The California and Connecticut
Approaches to Supermarket Privacy, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 143, 144-45 (2002) (stating that
supermarkets use customer discount cards associated with a customer's Social Security number or
driver's license number to record purchases of food, personal hygiene products, tobacco products,
alcohol, over-the-counter medicines, and sometimes prescription drugs, and that they share such
information with marketers and product manufacturers); Lisa Jane McGuire, Comment, Banking
on Biometrics: Your Bank's New High-Tech Method of Identification May Mean Giving Up Your
Privacy, 33 AKRON L. REV. 441, 442-43 (2000). For a discussion of the different types of data in
computer-based profiling, see sources cited supra note 31 and accompanying text.
178. Jane Kaufman Winn & James R. Wrathall, Who Owns the Customer? The Emerging Law
of Commercial Transactions in Electronic Customer Data, 56 Bus. LAW. 213, 218 (2000) ("The
regulation of the airline CRS system is an early example of the importance of data warehousing
and customer profiling to competition in global markets."). See generally Timothy M. Ravich,
Deregulation of the Airline Computer Reservation Systems (CRS) Industry, 69 J. AIR L. & COM.
387 (2004) (discussing airline deregulation and the use of computer reservation systems).
179. See 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (2000); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 80 (1986) ("Purposeful
racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection
. . . . ").
180. See DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE AFrER SEPTEMBER 11, at 5 (2003) ("Surveillance . .
refers to routine ways in which focused attention is paid to personal details by organizations that
want to influence, manage, or control certain persons or populations.").
181. See id. at 11 ("Surveillance is always ambiguous; care and control are always in tension.")
(emphasis added); David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on
Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003); Mark G. Young, Note, What Big Eyes and
Ears You Have!: A New Regime for Covert Governmental Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
1017, 1018 (2001).
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try without due process of the law. 182 Later, during the Civil War,
President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus on
eight occasions.' 83 And in 1875, in Totten v. United States, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld President Lincoln's authority to enter into a con-
tract with a private citizen to spy on Confederate troops.184 In 1917,
during World War I, federal authorities prosecuted opponents to the war
under the Espionage Act.'8 5 Most infamously, on February 19, 1942
President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the interment of Japanese
Americans to designated military areas, a decision upheld by Korematsu
v. United States 1 8 6-a now disgraced decision.187 The legacy of "us
against them" domestic and foreign policy brings into focus the broad
question whether legitimate ends, such as national security, are justified
by any means, including the deprivation of civil liberties and other rights
for particular groups of people. The topic of airline passenger profiling
encapsulates this analytic tension, touching on the narrower, disturbing
question whether reason and racism are symbionts and not mutually
exclusive when it comes to protecting commercial aviation from
terrorism.
A federal district judge recently framed the central controversy of
airline passenger profiling:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, this country has
struggled to meet the stringent demands of national security and,
simultaneously, to protect the civil rights of the American people.
Some have argued that the practice of racial profiling, wherein law
enforcement officials or others single out members of a particular
race for heightened investigatory scrutiny, based primarily or exclu-
sively on racial characteristics that allegedly correlate with criminal-
ity, represents a conflict between those twin goals. They argue that
although members of all races are entitled to be treated equally, racial
profiling is a rational and effective security measure. Others argue,
much more persuasively, that racial profiling is not a legitimate
182. See Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24
(2000)); Act of June 25, 1798 (Alien Enemies Act), ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (expired 1800).
183. See Rosenzweig, supra note 22, at 668.
184. 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875).
185. Espionage Act (Barbour Espionage Act), ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C. (2000)).
186. 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944).
187. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the
"Racing" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists", 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 11 (2001); Mark Tushnet,
Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 273, 273
(2003); Frank H. Wu, Profiling in the Wake of September 11: The Precedent of the Japanese
American Internment, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2002, at 52, 54-55; Liam Braber, Comment,
Korematsu's Ghost: A Post-September 11 th Analysis of Race and National Security, 47 VILL. L.
REV. 451, 467-69 (2002).
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security measure, and that at least in the realm of discrimination, lib-
erty and security do not conflict. 18
8
In its most benign form, profiling airline passengers for security pur-
poses helps to distinguish high-risk passengers from low- or no-risk pas-
sengers. Profiling after September 11, however, has come to mean
something more sinister.
Americans resisted profiling before September 11, but later wel-
comed it.' 89 Following the thwarted liquid-bomb plot of August 10,
2006 the Wall Street Journal appealed to common sense and criticized
TSA's refusal to use religious or ethnic factors as even minor factors in
screening:
Nobody is suggesting using ethnicity or religion as the only-or even
the primary-factors in profiling terrorists. But it also makes no
sense to take zero account of the fact that every suicide attack against
U.S. aviation to date has been perpetrated by men of Muslim origin.
While al Qaeda is no doubt seeking recruits who don't obviously dis-
play such characteristics, that doesn't mean we should ignore the
likeliest candidates.
The law on this is settled, and in the other direction. On multi-
ple occasions the federal courts have upheld programs that treat
groups differently when a "compelling" public interest can be identi-
fied: affirmative action, minority set-asides, composition of Congres-
sional districts, and the all-male draft have all met that legal test. Yet
the same people who would allocate jobs, federal contracts and col-
lege admissions by race or ethnicity object to using them merely as
one factor in deciding whom to inconvenience for a few minutes at an
airline checkpoint. Surely aviation security is a far more compelling
188. Alshrafi v. American Airlines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 150, 152 (D. Mass. 2004).
189. See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
163, 163 (2002) (stating that after September 11, 58% of Gallup poll respondents favored the
screening of Arabs more intensely than other passengers by airlines); David A. Harris, New
Approaches to Ensuring the Legitimacy of Police Conduct: Racial Profiling Redux, 22 ST. Louis
U. PuB. L. REV. 73, 74 (2003) ("[A]fter the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
over fifty percent of Americans . . . said they supported the use of profiling, as long as it was
targeted at Middle Easterners and Muslims in airports."); Leti Volpp, Blaming Culture for Bad
Behavior, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 89, 95-96 (2000) (noting misdeeds of whites often are
perceived as the acts of individuals and not norms associated with race, while the converse
perception exists as to other races); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REv.
1575, 1576-77 (2002) [hereinafter The Citizen and the Terrorist] (noting that there is a "public
consensus that racial profiling is a good thing, and in fact necessary for survival"); Vikram David
Amar, Opinion, When Racial Profiling Is Appropriate, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at M2 ("Fifty-
eight percent of Americans favored 'more intensive security checks' for persons (including
American citizens) of Arab descent; 49% favored 'special ID' cards for such people; and 33%
backed special surveillance.").
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public interest than the allocation of federal set-asides.' 9 °
Stated another way:
[T]he mathematical probability that a randomly chosen Arab passen-
ger might attempt a mass-murder-suicide hijacking-while tiny-is
considerably higher than the probability that a randomly chosen
white, black, Hispanic, or Asian passenger might do the same. In
constitutional-law parlance, while racial profiling may be presump-
tively unconstitutional, that presumption is overcome in the case of
airline passengers, because the government has a compelling interest
in preventing mass-murder-suicide hijackings, and because close
scrutiny of Arablooking [sic] people is narrowly tailored to protect
that interest. 191
This outlook was formalized when the nation's sixteen intelligence
agencies released the National Intelligence Estimate in July 2007. That
document, expressing the intelligence community's most unified and
authoritative written judgments on national security issues, singled out
occupants of certain parts of the world-Islamic fundamentalists, partic-
ularly the al Qaeda terror network, Lebanese and Iranian-backed Hizbal-
lah, Salafi, and smaller non-Muslim ("single issue") groups-as posing
a "persistent and evolving terrorist threat" to the United States.
192
Accordingly, profiling may be supportable on grounds more substantial
than common sense.
The gut appeal of profiling does not make it any easier to formulate
a commercial aviation security policy that profiles lawfully.'93 The
190. Editorial, The 'Profiling' Debate, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2006, at A10 (arguing that
avoiding screening on the basis of ethnic and religious background has resulted in "a policy of
random searches that focuses scarce screening resources as much on eight-year-old girls as on 22-
year-old men with Pakistani passports."); see also Lowry, supra note 48, at 32 ("Arab-American
groups still scream at any suggestion of commonsense security at airports, while the Bush
administration still cowers at any association with 'racial profiling.' It has become clear in recent
weeks that the pieties of American racial politics will remain unchanged-even after contributing
to a mass murder."). But see Debra J. Saunders, Editorial, Go Ahead, Search Granny, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 17, 2006, at B7 ("Why . . . search little old white ladies when young Arab and
Muslim men were behind the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and other terrorist plots? The answer is: The
feds should avoid racial profiling because it breeds discontent without enhancing security.").
191. Stuart Taylor Jr., The Case for Using Racial Profiling at Airports, NAT'L J., Sept. 22,
2001, at 2877. But see Naureen Kamdar, 'Muslim Americans are Americans, Too'; Airport
Security's Stereotypical Act Shames System, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 20, 2007, at 1 A, for an
editorial by an American college student of Pakistani heritage selected for heightened airport
screening. "I even understand that suspicion of Muslims is inevitable.... What I don't understand
is why of any of that-beards or scarves included-allows bullying of American Muslims by
airport security officials," she said. Id.
192. NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: THE TERRORIST
THREAT TO THE US HOMELAND (July 2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/pressreleases/
20070717_release.pdf.
193. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr., The Skies Won't Be Safe Until We Use Commonsense
Profiling, in CIVIL LIBERTIES VS. NATIONAL SECURITY IN A POST-9/11 WORLD 157 (M. Katherine
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Constitution is the measure of the reasonableness of any federal aviation
policy that interferes with personal rights. The Fourth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution is where the competing ideals of national security,
on one hand, and civil liberties and personal privacy, on the other hand,
interface.194 The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 195
Some of the earliest cases relating the Fourth Amendment to commercial
aviation security arose in the context of boarding gate searches via metal
detectors and magnetometers. Both metal detectors and magnetometers
are court-sanctioned procedures on the basis that there is little practical-
ity in obtaining a search warrant for every airline passenger who passes
through an airport terminal. Ample decisional law upholds the type of
airport searches conducted by metal detectors and magnetometers as
routine and regular aspects of airline travel that proportionally and
defensibly intrude on personal liberty interests in favor of public safety
and welfare. 1 96  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reasoned,
the search for the sole purpose of discovering weapons and prevent-
B. Darmer et al. eds., 2004); Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and
Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 296-97 (2002); Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling
Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1413-14 (2002); Peter H. Schuck, A Case for Profiling,
AM. LAW., Jan. 2002, at 59; Ronald J. Sievert, Meeting the Twenty-first Century Terrorist Threat
Within the Scope of Twentieth Century Constitutional Law, 37 Hous. L. REv. 1421, 1450-56
(2000); Ryan L. Bangert, Comment, When Airlines Profile Based on Race: Are Claims Brought
Against Airlines Under State Anti-Discrimination Laws Preempted by the Airline Deregulation
Act?, 68 J. AIR L. & COM. 791, 817 (2003); Donna Smith, Comment, Passenger Profiling: A
Greater Terror Than Terrorism Itself?, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 167, 170 (1998).
194. See, e.g., John Rogers, Note, Bombs, Borders, and Boarding: Combating International
Terrorism at United States Airports and the Fourth Amendment, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv.
501, 511-12 (1997); Brett Andrew Skean, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the New Face
of Terrorism: How September l1th Could Change the Way America Flies, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REv.
567, 579 (2002).
195. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
196. See, e.g., United States v. Fern, 484 F.2d 666, 666-69 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Miner, 484 F.2d 1075, 1077 (9th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Doran, 482 F.2d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Kroll, 481
F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Miller, 480 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408, 410-11 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Skipwith, 482
F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37, 39-40 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Burton, 475 F.2d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44,
48 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 673 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701, 703 (3d Cir.
1971).
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ing air piracy, and not for the purpose of discovering weapons and
precriminal events, fully justified the minimal invasion of personal
privacy by magnetometer. The use of the device, unlike frisking,
cannot possibly be "an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliat-
ing experience." '19 7
Profiling proponents discount neither the Constitution generally nor
the Fourth Amendment specifically. Rather, they argue that common
sense is not inconsistent with the Constitution. Yet, equating Arabs,
Middle Easterners, Muslims, or any other group with terrorism is inequi-
table and contrary to law. Sociologically, too, marginalizing passengers
along demographic lines ignores the fact that passengers selected for
heightened screening are probably law-abiding citizens posing no threat
to any facet of society. 198 In this respect, some critics of aviation secur-
ity policy perceive airline passenger profiling to be overtly racist, where
"flying while brown" and "flying while Arab"' 99 is akin to "driving
while black."2 0 Inflammatory remarks by politicians do not help: a
197. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972) ("To require a search
warrant as a prerequisite to the use of a magnetometer would exalt form over substance.... The
danger is so well known, the governmental interest so overwhelming, and the invasion of privacy
so minimal, that the warrant requirement is excused by the exigent national circumstances."); see
also United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The essential purpose of the
scheme is not to detect weapons or explosives or to apprehend those who carry them, but to deter
persons carrying such material from seeking to board at all.").
198. See Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, supra note 189, at 1598 ("Those who appear
'Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim' and who are formally citizens of the United States are now
being thrust outside of the protective ambit of citizenship as identity."); see also Muneer I.
Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92
CAL. L. REV. 1259 passim (2004) (discussing acts of violence against Arabs, Muslims, and South
Asians and governmental profiling after September 11); Raquel Aldana-Pindell, The 9/11
"National Security" Cases: Three Principles Guiding Judges' Decision-Making, 81 OR. L. REV.
985, 1032-33 (2002) (noting that in the course of the "domestic war on terrorism," 3% of 1000
people detained-often as a result of racial, ethnic, or religious profiling-have been charged with
terrorist acts or linked to al Qaeda); Adrien Katherine Wing, Civil Rights in the Post 911 World:
Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism, 63 LA. L. REV. 717, 718
(2003) (discussing profiling, hate crimes, and detention directed at Arabs and Muslims after
September 11).
199. See, e.g., Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 546-47 (7th Cir. 2006); Tracey
Maclin, "Voluntary" Interviews and Airport Searches of Middle Eastern Men: The Fourth
Amendment in a Time of Terror, 73 Miss. L.J. 471, 472-79 (2003); Dalia Hashad, Stolen
Freedoms: Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians in the Wake of Post 9/11 Backlash, 81 DENY. U. L.
REV. 735, 735 (2004); Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United
States Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2879-80 (2001); Ellen Baker,
Comment, Flying While Arab-Racial Profiling and Air Travel Security, 67 J. AIR L. & CoM.
1375, 1375-77 (2002); Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Note & Comment, Flying While Brown: Federal
Civil Rights Remedies to Post-9/11 Airline Racial Profiling of South Asians, 10 ASIAN L.J. 215,
215-16 (2003).
200. See, e.g., David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While
Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 269 (1999); Lenese C. Herbert, Bte Noire: How Race-
Based Policing Threatens National Security, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 149, 172 (2003); Floyd D.
Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling of African-American Males: Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of
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Louisiana Congressman who favors airline passenger profiling, for
example, spat, "a person who has 'a diaper on his head and a fan belt
wrapper around the diaper' needs to be singled out for questioning. '"201
Obviously, there is a better way to make the point that racial profiling
may be reasonable, and many proponents of airline passenger profiling
have appealed to the logic of profiling on the basis of ethnicity, political
agenda, race, or religious affiliation, given the historical demographics
of terrorists.2 °2
Aviation security policy makers must identify dangerous people as
a practical matter, whatever the legal, psycho-physiological, or scientific
validity of profiling systems. Security officials must imagine
precedented and unprecedented threats from all passengers, not least of
whom are passengers whose background fits with those who have terror-
ized commercial airline travel historically. The federal government's
systematic targeting of a substantial subset of its population (i.e., airline
passengers) no doubt challenges ideals expressed in the Constitution,
and particularly in the Bill of Rights. Therefore, the paramount ques-
tions for aviation security policy makers are whether and how it is possi-
ble to balance-not exchange-airline safety with civil liberties.20 3
These questions are likely to endure as long as any terrorist threat to
commercial aviation persists.
Constitutional Protection, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 439, 440-42 (2004). The DOJ has stated that
racial profiling
at its core concerns the invidious use of race or ethnicity as a criterion in conducting
stops, searches and other law enforcement investigative procedures. It is premised
on the erroneous assumption that any particular individual of one race or ethnicity is
more likely to engage in misconduct than any particular individual of another race
or ethnicity.
U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/guidance on-race.
htm; cf Deborah A. Ramirez et al., Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 World, 40
Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2003) (noting that the use of racial profiling raises questions "as
to whether law enforcement officials exercise their [discretionary powers] fairly and without
discrimination").
201. Dennis Camire, Muslim Council Seeks Action Against Cooksey for Slur, GANNETT NEWS
SERV., Sept. 21, 2001.
202. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Racial Profiling and Antiterrorism Efforts, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1201, 1203-04 (2004); Stephen J. Ellmann, Racial Profiling and Terrorism, 46 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 675, 685-87 (2002-2003); David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Revisited: "Just Common
Sense" in the Fight Against Terror?, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2002, at 36, 37 (2002); R. Spencer
Macdonald, Note, Rational Profiling in America's Airports, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 113, 118-19
(2002); John Derbyshire, In Defense of Racial Profiling, NAT'L REV., Feb. 19, 2001, at 38.
203. See, e.g., Emanuel Gross, The Struggle of a Democracy Against Terrorism-Protection of
Human Rights: The Right to Privacy Versus the National Interest-The Proper Balance, 37
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 27, 29-31 (2004).
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C. Security or Privacy: A False Choice?
In a national "Civil Liberties Survey" conducted during the four
months following September 11, a sample of American citizens
expressed their relative willingness to trade civil liberties for greater per-
sonal safety and security. 2" A decision to tolerate this exchange is com-
plex, a product of a person's own social and psychological profile,
including dogmatism (closed-mindedness), capability for interpersonal
trust (faith in people), feelings of national pride and patriotism, along
with a person's race and ethnicity, education, age, and community.2 °5
After September 11, Americans appeared to favor civil liberties over
security in the abstract, rather than in actual situations.2"6
Like the concepts of liberty, privacy, and security themselves, soci-
ety and its citizens are defined and moved by circumstance.20 7 The
national impulse to promote security over privacy and over personal
rights has dissipated since September 11.208 Citizens have returned to
their September 11 routines as they were before. Today, increasingly,
Americans greet successively intrusive national security measures by the
federal government with an "anti-anti-terrorism" sentiment that is based
on concerns about an ever-expanding executive and a "fear of technol-
ogy.' '20 9 Some citizens "equate the potential for abuse of Executive
Branch authority with the existence of actual abuse" and protest "any
expansion of executive authority, notwithstanding the potential for
benign and beneficial results, because they judge the potential for the
abuse of power to outweigh the benefits gained. 210 In this context,
TSA's promise to remedy mistakes by profiling systems like CAPPS,
CAPPS II, and Secure Flight after the fact is no assurance for many
Americans. Similarly, for privacy advocates and civil libertarians, the
idea that the federal government or private vendors or both will have
access to an airline passenger's personal and biometric data through sys-
tems like Registered Traveler is intolerable. Some government officials
204. Davis & Silver, supra note 12, at 28.
205. Id. at 31-32.
206. Id. at 32.
207. Id. at 28 ("Context-specific events provide critical insight into the level of commitment to
democratic principles .... For ordinary citizens during ordinary times, civil liberties issues are
likely to be remote from everyday experience; but in certain contexts civil liberties issues have
immediate implications for people's sense of freedom and well-being.") (citations omitted).
208. See, e.g., Cerabino, supra note 11, at 1A ("'I knew a lot of people in the World Trade
Center, and the next day when I came to work, I couldn't even stand to hear the word "privacy,"'
said ... a senior analyst with Competitive Enterprise Institute, a group that advocates limiting
government controls. 'But the cost of being wrong about some of these issues seems appallingly
high.' ").
209. See Rosenzweig, supra note 22, at 663-64.
210. Id. at 664.
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even acknowledge the perception that the government cannot monitor its
own activities.21' Indeed, a willingness to exchange civil liberties for
security turns on trust and confidence in government.212
The cynic's view-that trust is irrelevant, that privacy is impossible
in today's Electronic Information Age, and that there is no meaningful
exchange of privacy for security to make-bears at least one mention.
2 1 3
Before September 11, an FAA Director of the Office of Civil Aviation
Security wondered whether "virtually all of the data that the U.S. gov-
ernment seeks to collect in CAPPS II is probably already available on
each of us through the Internet. 21 4 Such statements serve the mis-
perception that it is hopeless to preserve privacy interests today. As one
commentator states:
The availability of information privacy horror stories (in particular,
the prevalence of identity theft, spam and hacker stories in the
media), and the general mistrust in government agencies to handle
personal information appropriately, combined with a general appre-
hension about technology and how it works, and the natural anxiety
relating to disclosure of personal, particularly intimate, information-
all spurred on by the privacy lobby-has created a public anxiety
about electronic privacy out of proportion to the actual privacy risks
and has obscured discussion of the very real threats posed by either
failing to provide security or by misallocating security resources.21 5
The events of September 11 mandate better security related intelli-
gence. Intelligence services should gather and share more information.
Airline passenger profiling systems are consistent with this objective.
Information networking vis-A-vis profiling is a limited and context spe-
cific societal objective that, in a post-September 11 environment, legiti-
mately challenges without eviscerating privacy interests. Arguably, to
best protect privacy rights "in the modern digital world, information pri-
vacy should be viewed as a societal value justifying a resolution in the
public interest, much like environmental policy and other societal con-
211. Samuel Podberesky, Assistant Gen. Counsel for Aviation Enforcement, Dep't of Transp.,
Address at the ABA-TIPS Aviation and Space Law Committee Annual Conference: Practical
Views from the Cockpit to the Courtroom (Oct. 22, 2004).
212. Davis & Silver, supra note 12, at 30.
213. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich, Privacy and Power, 89 GEO. L.J. 2047, 2047 (2001); Richard
S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO.
L.J. 2381, 2381 (1996); Glenn Negley, Philosophical Views on the Value of Privacy, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 319, 319 (1966); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1170 (2000); Shaun B. Spencer, Security vs. Privacy: Refraining the Debate,
79 DENV. U. L. REV. 519, 554 (2002); Kimberly A. Horn, Note, Privacy Versus Protection:
Exploring the Boundaries of Electronic Surveillance in the Internet Age, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
2233, 2264-66 (2002).
214. Vincent, supra note 43, at 8.
215. Taipale, supra note 12, at 137-38 (footnotes omitted).
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cerns, with less emphasis on individual self-policing and market-based
mechanisms."2 6 This perspective is unlikely to take hold in the United
States today. While over half of a sample of American citizens sup-
ported a trade-off involving the right of privacy by requiring a national
identity card after September 11, 82% of those surveyed preferred civil
liberties over security when the surveyors framed the right to privacy
issue in terms of racial profiling.217
Ultimately, the Fourth Amendment, not a sample survey, must bal-
ance national security interests and privacy concerns. The Fourth
Amendment is designed to protect citizens against unreasonable
searches and seizures of their personal belongings. The requirement that
the federal government secure a warrant supported by a showing of
probable cause, in turn, is predicated on whether a citizen has a "reason-
able expectation of privacy. 21 8 Whether data mining and airline pas-
senger profiling constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment
remains an open question. 219 For now, controversial legislation like the
PATRIOT Act220 and abated or developing profiling systems like
216. James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV.
1, 7 (2003).
217. Davis & Silver, supra note 12, at 32-33.
218. Ramasastry, supra note 56, at 763.
219. See id. at 763-64. See generally Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace:
Informational Privacy in the Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1185 (1997); Paul
Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the American Legal
Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1345-47 (1992); Daniel J. Solove, Digital
Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1151-56
(2002); Joseph T. Thai, Is Data Mining Ever a Search Under Justice Stevens's Fourth
Amendment?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1731, 1735 (2006); Kathleen A. Linert, Note, Database
Marketing and Personal Privacy in the Information Age, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 687,
693-95 (1995).
220. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). For more information on the PATRIOT
Act, see, for example, Robert N. Davis, Striking the Balance: National Security vs. Civil Liberties,
29 BROOK J. INT'L L. 175, 176 (2003); Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA
Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 607, 607-08 (2003); Peter G.
Madrinan, Note, Devil in the Details: Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Internet
Surveillance Provisions of the USA Patriot Act of 2001, 64 U. PITt. L. REV. 783, 790-96 (2003);
John T. Soma et al., Balance of Privacy vs. Security: A Historical Perspective of the USA
PATRIOT Act, 31 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 285 passim (2005); John W. Whitehead &
Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland Security": A Constitutional
Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department's Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM.
U. L. REV. 1081 passim (2002); Michael F. Dowley, Note, Government Surveillance Powers
Under the USA PATRIOT Act: Is It Possible To Protect National Security and Privacy at the
Same Time? A Constitutional Tug-of-War, 36 Suffolk U. L. REV. 165 passim (2002); Jacob R.
Lilly, Note, National Security at What Price?: A Look into Civil Liberty Concerns in the
Information Age Under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and a Proposed Constitutional Test for
Future Legislation, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 447 (2003); Michael T. McCarthy, Recent
Developments, USA Patriot Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 435 passim (2002).
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CAPPS II and Secure Flight are enacted or developed at a distance from
citizens through technical legal papers, closed communication channels,
and uninviting bureaucracy. The federal government, and TSA specifi-
cally, can and should do more to publicize the merits of airline passen-
ger screening systems and to reassure citizens about the status of their
traveling rights in the current, insecure environment of commercial
aviation.
D. An International Perspective: E.U.-U.S.
Terrorists target international air travel because of aviation's global
reach.22 1 "[A]viation allows the US and its allies to be accessible glob-
ally for attack without the need to infiltrate through the home territory of
a target-be it government, business, or their representatives." '222 The
destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 illustrates this principle in action. Pan
Am Flight 103 was traveling from London to New York when it was
blown up by plastic explosives while flying over Lockerbie, Scotland in
December 1988.223 While Pan Am was not a state-owned "flag carrier"
of the United States, it was iconic of America. By destroying such sym-
bols without also incurring their own casualties, terrorists create
"psychopolitical impact-e.g., influence on worldviews, ideologies, pol-
icy preferences, preferred lifestyles, and related behaviors of physical
and psychological survivors and of other direct and indirect observers of
terrorist operations-through their operations so as to ultimately induce
221. See supra Part II. See generally S.K. GHOSH, AIRCRAFr HIJACKING AND THE DEVELOPING
LAW 13 (1985) (stating that aircraft hijacking is often intended to gain "world-wide publicity");
NANCY DOUGLAS JOYNER, AERIAL HIJACKING AS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME (1974) (noting that
the international community recognizes the existence of threats to global air safety); EDWARD
MCWHINNEY, AERIAL PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (2d ed. 1987) (discussing the
potential for worldwide publicity regarding the disruption and dislocation of international air
transportation and the resulting attention for the political cause responsible for such problems).
222. Motivation and Aviation as a Terrorism Target, supra note 139.
223. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 811 (2d Cir.
1994), cert. denied sub nom. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Pagnucco, 513 U.S. 1126
(1995); Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306, 308 (E.D.N.Y.
1995); Nancy Jean Strantz, Aviation Security and Pan Am Flight 103: What Have We Learned?,
56 J. AIR L. & CoM. 413, 414-15 (1990); Aphrodite Thevos Tsairis, International Terrorism:
Prevention and Remedies: Lessons of Lockerbie, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 31, 31 (1996).
A former Director of the Office of Policy and Planning for Civil Aviation Security at the Federal
Aviation Administration found a disturbing irony in the fact that the bombing of Pan Am Flight
103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 did not catalyze significant upgrades to aviation security,
but the TWA Flight 800 accident in 1996, an event unrelated to terrorism, did: "[S]everal other
events had come together at about the same time [as TWA Hight 800] to enable this tidal change
to occur. First, several major terrorist events within the United States [occurred], beginning in
1993.... [They] include[d] the World Trade Center bombing and the murders at the headquarters
of the Central Intelligence Agency .... [They also included] the revelation in early 1995 of the
plot ... to destroy a large number of U.S. civil aircraft in Asia .... " Anthony Fainberg, Aviation
Security in the United States: Current and Future Trends, 25 TRANSp. L.J. 195, 196-97 (1998).
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behavioral change in the world that corresponds to desired political
goals. 224
The psychopolitical impact of September 11, too, was profound as
it involved terrorist activities not overseas, but on domestic airplanes
inside the United States. American leaders nevertheless emphasized that
the World Trade Center was destroyed on September 11 to make clear
that aviation terrorism is a worldwide peril that requires international
vigilance. Yet, global solutions to airline safety concerns have been dif-
ficult to achieve. Although the United States and the European Union
share a common interest in maximizing aviation security, each balances
security against civil liberties in culturally discrete and sometimes
opposed ways.225 These differences are not quaint cultural variations,
but significant impediments to securing the airways between sovereign
nations in a uniform way.226
Whereas Americans approach privacy as a safeguard of their liberty
interests, Europeans conceptualize privacy as a basic human right ensur-
ing personal dignity.227 That is,
[w]hen Europeans think about privacy, they are most concerned
about personal dignity and the right to control one's public image, a
right threatened primarily by the mass media, the Internet, and com-
mercial data warehouses. By contrast, American conceptions of pri-
224. Terrorist Motivation and Preferred Aviation Targets, IBPPONLINE, Nov. 5, 2003, http://
security.pr.erau.edu/read.php?kind=html&articlevolume= 1 5&articleissue= 1 O&articletitle=
Terrorist%20Motivation%20and%20Preferred%20Aviation%20Targets.
225. See, e.g., Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative
Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609 (2007); Edward C. Harris,
Personal Data Privacy Tradeoffs and How a Swedish Church Lady, Austrian Public Radio
Employees, and Transatlantic Air Carriers Show That Europe Does Not Have the Answers, 22
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 745 (2007).
226. The International Civil Aviation Organization, an agency of the United Nations, has
adopted three international multilateral conventions on aviation security: the Hague Convention,
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641,
860 U.N.T.S. 105 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1971); the Montreal Convention, Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971,24 U.S.T. 565,
974 U.N.T.S. 177 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1973); and the Tokyo Convention, Convention on
Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941,
704 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Dec. 4, 1969). See Dionigi (Dan) M. Fiorita, Aviation
Security: International Response, 3 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 267, 281-93 (1993).
227. Jeffrey Rosen, Continental Divide, LEGAL Ai'., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 49 (" 'Why is it that
French people won't talk about their salaries but will take off their bikini tops?... Why is it that
Americans comply with court discovery orders that open essentially all of their documents for
inspection,' but refuse to carry national identity cards?") (quoting James Q. Whitman, The Two
Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1160 (2004)); see also
Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Attacks on America-Privacy Implications of Heightened Security
Measures in the United States, Europe, and Canada, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 83, 91, 98-99 (2002);
David Banisar & Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection: An International Survey of
Privacy, Data Protection, and Surveillance Laws and Developments, 18 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 8-9, 108 (1999).
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vacy are focused on personal liberty and the right to be free from
state surveillance, a right threatened primarily by government intru-
sions into the home.228
"Europeans are also far more trusting of government, and willing to
allow it to regulate personal choices in ways that Americans would find
intolerable ... 229 In this context, airline passenger profiling systems
in Europe have evaluated data that not even the CAPPS II and Secure
Flight systems proposed to consider. Before September 11, airline pas-
senger profiling systems in Europe used the input of law enforcement
agencies such as the international policy agency INTERPOL.230 Addi-
tionally, overseas profiling systems detailed information such as whether
a "traveler contribut[ed] to certain suspect charitable organizations. '231
Meanwhile, since 2001 Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam has operated a
system called "Privium. ' 23 2 Like the Registered Traveler program just
being deployed in the United States in 2007, Privium fast-tracks passen-
gers through security checkpoints in exchange for a fee and certain per-
sonal and biometric information (e.g., fingerprint or iris scan). 23 3
Ironically, what often is
[1]ost in the partisan uproar in America over the USA Patriot Act is
the surprising fact that the expansion of state surveillance authority in
Europe after September 11 is arguably more draconian than in the
United States ....
• . .Europe's greater deference to government authority led
countries like Germany and France to adopt surveillance measures
after September 11 that in some ways make the Patriot Act seem
meek .... For example, in 2002 Germany adopted a sweeping law
that increased the power of its security agencies. The government
was authorized to create a central database with personal information
228. Rosen, supra note 227, at 49.
229. Id. For example, the Belgium, French, and German governments reserve the right to
refuse to register objectionable names chosen by parents for their infants. Id.
230. E.g., Michael Satchell, Everyone Empty Your Pockets?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr.
1, 2002, at 18.
231. Armstrong & Pereira, supra note 144, at Al.
232. Nicola Clark, EU Weighs Voluntary Plan To Speed Airport Check-ins, INT'L HERALD
TRIE., Aug. 19, 2006, at 6.
233. Id. Meanwhile, on June 18, 2007 Canada implemented "Passenger Protect," an online
system though which passengers older than twelve must supply a government-issued photo
identification before boarding commercial airplanes, and airlines themselves must screen
passengers traveling into, out of, or across Canada against a government-issued "No Fly" list of
known terrorists or people convicted of crimes against aviation security. Call the Mounties,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., May 21, 2007, at 36, 36; see also Roger Belgrave, Does No-Fly
List Violate Privacy?, BRAM-rON GUARDIAN (Canada), July 1, 2007, at 21 (quoting Canadian
Member of Parliament as stating, "I think we're asking for a lot of trouble for a lot of innocent
people"). See generally Jennifer McClennan & Vadim Schick, "0, Privacy" Canada's
Importance in the Development of the International Data Privacy Regime, 38 GEO. J. INr'L L. 669
(2007).
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about foreigners, including fingerprints and religious background.
The law also authorized the German national identification cards to
include biometric data, such as fingerprints. And it explicitly
endorsed data mining ... requiring government agencies to turn per-
sonal information over to the federal police.23 4
Existing anti-aviation terrorism security devices employed by the
European Union, juxtaposed with developing profiling systems in the
United States, suggest that airline passenger screening should be the
subject of ready international cooperation. Indeed, "[i]t is now generally
accepted that increased information sharing is the best way of preventing
terrorism, but information sharing between the public and private sector
may be difficult if Americans are focused on the dangers of state surveil-
lance and Europeans are concerned about protecting the dignity of the
consumer."235 In fact, U.S. and E.U. aviation security policies today are
fractured around the issues of privacy and security.
Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
("ATSA") in reaction to September 11, requiring airlines flying to and
from the United States to provide federal authorities with electronic
access to PNR information. Through ATSA, the United States has
pressed European security officials specifically for pre-flight informa-
tion contained in an Advance Passenger Information System. 236 How-
ever, of the approximately thirty-nine pieces of information that
comprise airline passenger profiles in the United States, twenty cannot
be disclosed under E.U. privacy laws.237 Consequently, the United
States' mandate for PNRs for international flights directly contradicts
the E.U. data protection law prohibiting the transfer of personal data to a
recipient who would not guarantee its protection. Moreover, airlines
with flights to the United States were put into an impossible situation:
They could either disclose protected passenger information in violation
234. Rosen, supra note 227, at 52.
235. Id.
236. Eric Lipton, Officials Seek Broader Access to Airline Data, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2006, at
Al.
237. Boggan, supra note 99. See generally Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of Privacy
Protection in the European Union and the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 174 (1999) (examining
the differences and conflicts between the European Union and the United States' data protection
policies); Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELY TECH.
L.J. 461 (2000) (stating that the European Union will not transfer personal data to the United
States because the United States does not meet the proper level of data protection); Gregory
Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in the
Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2000) (discussing the current
dispute between the United States and the European Union regarding the protection of data-
privacy rights); Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection
of Personal Data, 80 IowA L. REv. 445 (1995) (summarizing the development of the European
Union's directive regulating the processing of personal data and what the directive entails).
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of E.U. law or withhold protected passenger information and be denied
landing rights in the United States. 238 Not surprisingly, the American
position engendered resentment, as when a French citizen opined:
"[W]hat right do [American authorities] have to turn the world's airlines
into their unpaid informers? Out here, in the real world, that is called
blackmail. '239  More officially, Frits Bolkestein, European Commis-
sioner responsible for Internal Market, Taxation and Customs Union
issues, noted that "[a]t the heart of this debate lies a fundamental ques-
tion: To what extent are we prepared to see our civil liberties eroded in
the search for greater security? The question becomes even more diffi-
cult when different nations come to different answers. ' 240  To resolve
the conflict, the United States agreed to keep passenger data for no more
than three-and-a-half years (a concession from an initial request to main-
tain data for seven years) solely for purposes relating to anti-
terrorism."'
This agreement has been invalidated, however. On May 30, 2006
the European Court of Justice-the highest court in the European Union,
located in Luxembourg-invalidated the agreement to transfer airline
passenger records from the European Union to DHS.24 2 The Court of
Justice acknowledged that the E.U.-U.S. agreement was to promote
security and deter terrorism. Nevertheless, it determined that the agree-
ment went outside Article 3(2) of the E.U. Data Protection Directive 95/
238. Boggan, supra note 99; see also Gehan Gunasekara, The 'Final' Privacy Frontier?
Regulating Trans-Border Data Flows, 15 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 362, 364 (2007) (evaluating
the scant value of "national safeguards and regimes for the protection of personal data or
information about individuals . .. as technology allows the information to be whisked out of the
jurisdiction at the proverbial click of a mouse"); Robert Block, U.S. Reaches Tentative Deal with
EU over Passenger Data, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2003, at D3 ("Washington required all airlines
flying to the U.S. to provide passenger data within 15 minutes of departure and threatened fines of
up to $6,000 per passenger and the loss of landing rights for noncompliance."); Kilroy, supra note
45; supra note 99 and accompanying text.
239. Paulina K. Dudzinski, Letter to the Editor, Sharing Personal Data, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Dec. 24, 2003, at 7; see also Audrey Hudson, U.S. Data Collection Worries Europe; Airlines
Caught in Legal Conflicts, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2003, at All ("'We understand the U.S.'s
sovereign right to determine the conditions on which people enter the country, we understand the
American reaction after September 11, but we need to find a solution to the privacy concerns
raised because it puts us in a position that is at odds with our own privacy directive,' [an
unidentified E.U.] source said.").
240. Frits Bolkestein, Passenger Privacy and the War on Terror; Resisting U.S. Demands,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 24, 2003, at 10.
241. See Tom Ramstack, EU, U.S. Reach Deal on Air-Passenger Data, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2003, at A06.
242. Joined Cases C-317/04 & C-318/04, Parliament v. Council and Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. I-
04721; John Ward Anderson & Keith L. Alexander, Court Voids U.S.-Europe Passenger
Agreement, WASH. POST, May 31, 2006, at A 11. See generally Allen Shoenberger, Privacy Wars:
EU Versus US: Scattered Skirmishes, Storm Clouds Ahead, 17 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 355
(2007).
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46, which governs processing operations concerning public security,
defense, and State security. 243 In the wake of this decision-and until
July 31, 2007-the European Union and the United States operated
under an interim accord allowing for the screening of passengers on arri-
val with information routinely given to airlines, including passengers'
addresses and credit card, passport, and phone numbers.2 44 Had that
agreement expired, the European Union and the United States would
have been back to a starting point where fundamental political, social,
and economic differences exist.245
IV. CONCLUSION
The "freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been
recognized as a basic right under the Constitution." '246 Airline travel in
particular has become such a usual part of life that many Americans
simply presume their freedom to it.247 In fact, airline service, not airline
security was the topic that had the attention of transportation lawmakers
throughout the 1990s. Airline passengers-including members of Con-
gress-fumed at airline overbooking practices, delays, and congestion at
241airports. September 11 jolted the nation's focus from service to
243. See Joined Cases C-317/04 & C-318/04, Parliament v. Council and Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R.
1-04721.
244. See, e.g., Jane Perlez, U.S. Urges Deal on Passenger Data; Agreement with European
Nations Expires at the End of July, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 14, 2007, at 3; Madhu
Unnikrishnan, TB Passenger Incident Fuels U.S.-EU Debate over PNR, AVIATION DAILY, June 4,
2007, at 2.
245. In June 2007 the United States reached a provisional agreement with the European Union
whereby it would be permitted to store nineteen (and not thirty-four) items of passenger name
record data about air passengers on a government-operated database for a period of fifteen years
for "scrutiny in serious crime and terrorism investigations." Jamie Smyth, EU, US Agree Deal To
Store Files on Air Passengers, IRISH TIMES, June 29, 2007, at 12. However, in a July 11, 2007
resolution, the European Parliament stated that it "[sitrongly regrets the lack of democratic
oversight of any kind" during negotiations and "[d]eplores ... that EU citizens' PNR data are to
be treated solely according to US law." European Parliament Resolution on the PNR Agreement
with the United States, EUR. PARL. Doc. (EN 0278) (2007), available at http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+MOTION+P6-RC-2007-0278+0+DOC+
PDF+VO//EN.
246. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966).
247. See, e.g., United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1989)
("Commercial air travel, once a luxury, has become a staple of modern existence. For many
Americans, boarding an airplane to travel across the state or across the country is as ordinary and
commonplace an event as boarding a bus or train fifty years ago, or mounting a horse-drawn
carriage around the turn of the century.").
248. See, e.g., Timothy M. Ravich, Re-Regulation and Airline Passengers' Rights, 67 J. AIR L.
& COM. 935, 942-46 (2002). For a discussion of airline passengers' rights initiatives overseas,
see Jeffrey Goh, Air Passenger Rights: The Third Way, 8 CONSUMER L.J. 407 (2000). On
February 14, 2007 nine crowded JetBlue Airways airplanes sat on the snow-covered tarmac of
JFK International Airport for six to ten hours. See Editorial, Making Amends; JetBlue Isn't the
Only One Thinking About a 'Bill ofRights'for Airline Passengers, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2007, at
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
security.249
In the aftermath of September 11, aviation security officials relent-
lessly hunt for bad things. They continually develop, contract for, and
deploy various high- and low-tech anti-terrorism measures, i.e., thermal-
neutron analysis to analyze luggage for chemicals used in plastic explo-
sives, computerized tomography to evaluate the quality of a substance,
X-ray devices and electromagnetic radiation to search for typical explo-
sives ingredients, trace detectors or "sniffers" to detect for vapor residue
of explosives, bomb-sniffing dogs, airline personnel screening, and auto-
mated passenger profiling.2 ° These layers of security are important, as
evidenced in July 2007 when the public learned from an unclassified
security bulletin that TSA had been investigating possible "dry-runs" by
aviation terrorists to smuggle weapons on airplanes.25  The argument to
A14. A week later, Denver-bound passengers aboard United Express airplanes were diverted
overnight to Cheyenne, Wyoming; passengers were shocked the next day to see the flight crew
leaving without them. See Gary Stoller, United Vows Reimbursement: Airline Says It's Taking
Care of Abandoned Fliers, USA TODAY, Apr. 4, 2007, at 5B. Earlier, on December 29, 2006
American Airlines passengers sat on airplanes for hours in Austin, Texas. See Margaret Carlson,
Editorial, Bush Wants Airlines To Run on Time, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 7, 2007, at
C4. Not surprisingly, the push for enforceable airline passengers' rights has been renewed. See
Airline Passenger Bill of Rights Act of 2007, H.R. 1303, 110th Cong.; Airline Passenger Bill of
Rights Act of 2007, S. 678, 110th Cong.
249. Rosenzweig, supra note 22, at 671 ("[A] better view of this history shows that the balance
between liberty and security is more like a pendulum that gets pushed off-center by significant
events (such as those of September l1th) than a spiral. Over time, after Americans have
recovered from the understandable human reaction to catastrophe and after the threat recedes, the
pendulum returns to center.").
250. See, e.g., Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need To Be Addressed, Testimony Before the
H. Subcomm. on Aviation, Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 104th Cong. 7-10 (1996)
(statement of Keith 0. Fultz, Assistant Comptroller General); John M. Doyle, 'I'm Looking
Through You'; TSA Seeks Improved Screening Technologies To Identify Carry-on Explosives and
Weapons, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., June 18, 2007, at 143; Steven A. Mirmina, Aviation
Safety and Security-Legal Developments, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 547, 547-53 (1998). Regrettably,
there is ample evidence showing the failure of devices designed to find explosives and dangerous
objects. See, e.g., Fake Bomb Fools British Airport Security, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July
2, 1990, at A2.
251. According to a July 20, 2007 report, it appears that federal air marshals and other law
enforcement agencies were warned of possible rehearsals of an actual terrorist event over the
period of September 2006 through July 2007. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., INCIDENTS AT U.S.
AIRPORTS MAY SUGGEST POSSIBLE PRE-ATTACK PROBING, TRANSP. INTELLIGENCE GAzETTE
(2007), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sectionsNEWS/pdfs/airport%20
warning.pdf (reporting suspicious seizures: (a) in San Diego, California, checked baggage
containing two icepacks (filled with clay rather than normal blue gel) covered in duct tape; (b) in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, carry-on baggage containing several items resembling an improvised
explosive device ("IED"), such as wire coil, an electrical switch, batteries, three tubes, and two
blocks of cheese; (c) checked baggage in Houston, Texas, containing a plastic bag with a 9-volt
battery, wires, a block of brown clay-like minerals, and pipes; and (d) in Baltimore, Maryland,
checked baggage containing a plastic bag with a block of processed cheese taped to another plastic
bag holding a cellular-phone charger); see also Siobhan Gorman, BWI Security the Focus;
Officials Play Down Report of Terror 'Dry Run,' BALTIMORE SUN, July 26, 2007, at 1B; Michael
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scrutinize airline passenger behavior through profiling or otherwise is
not an argument for diminished screening of dangerous objects.252
However, "the 'magic' attributed to isolated technological fixes must be
jettisoned in favor of systems perspectives including the human ele-
ment. '253  People warrant at least as much attention as putatively dan-
gerous objects. Biometric, psychometric, and sociometric profiling
facilitates this objective by focusing on people and their ideas and
behaviors, not just their weapons.
This is not to say that airline passengers should exchange their civil
liberties for security thoughtlessly or eagerly. Yet, that is what seems to
happen. On February 23, 2007 federal aviation security officials tested
"SmartCheck" at Sky Harbor International Airport in Phoenix, Ari-
zona. 425  SmartCheck is a $110,000 radiation-emitting, "backscatter"
machine that "peeks underneath [airline] passengers' clothing to search
for guns, bombs or liquid explosives. '"255 While SmartCheck will screen
only volunteers initially, the ACLU has objected that it effects a "virtual
strip-search. ' 256  Nevertheless, as one reporter noted, "[i]f passengers
• . . who were asked to undergo body scans are an indication, security
J. Sniffen, Airports Warned About Terror Dry Runs, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 25, 2007, WL 7/25/
07 APWIRES 04:42:51.
252. In April 2005, in reaction to Richard Reid's 2001 attempt to detonate explosives hidden in
his shoes on a Paris-Miami flight, TSA prohibited passengers from carrying lighters on airplanes.
See Joe Sharkey, Lighters Banned on Flights, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 7, 2005, at 1 ("Each
passenger can still carry on up to four books of safety matches. The reasoning there is that
lighters can be used like little blowtorches, while matches cannot. Matches and lighters of all
kinds remain prohibited from checked bags."). Just over two years later, effective August 4, 2007,
the ban on lighters was lifted. See, e.g., Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., TSA Announces
Procedural Changes at the Checkpoint: Common Lighters No Longer Banned from Carry-ons,
Breast Milk Exemption Modified (July 20, 2007), available at http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/
2007/press-release 07202007.shtm. The TSA's relaxation of the prohibition of lighters in the
name of efficiency is puzzling. See, e.g., Michael J. Sniffen, TSA Eases Carry-on Rules for
Lighters, Breast Milk, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 21, 2007, at A7 (" 'Explosives remain the most
significant threat to aviation,' TSA administrator Kip Hawley said. 'By enabling our [airport-
screening] officers to focus on the greatest threats, we are using our officers' time and energy
more effectively and increasing security for passengers."') (alteration in original).
253. Special Article: Outline on Status of Post-9/ll Aviation Security Initiatives, Part I,
IBPPONLINE, May 3, 2002, http://security.pr.erau.edu/read.php?kind=html&articlevolume=12&
articleissue= 16&articletitle=Special%20Article%3A%200utline%20on%20Status%20of%20
Post-9%2F1 1%20Aviation%20Security%201nitiatives%2C%2Part%201; see also supra note 28
and accompanying text.
254. Paul Giblin & Eric Lipton, New Airport X-rays Scan Bodies, Not Just Bags, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 2007, at Al ("Special 'privacy' software intentionally blurs the image, creating an outline
of a body that is clear enough to see a collarbone, bellybutton or weapon, but flattens details of
revealing contours.").
255. Id.
256. Thomas Frank, Phoenix Test Site for TSA X-ray; ACLU Objects to 'Virtual Strip Search,'
USA TODAY, Dec. 1, 2006, at IA.
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trumps privacy. 257 On the first day SmartCheck was deployed, "[m]ost
passengers asked to submit to a full-body X-ray at Security Checkpoint
B didn't bat an eyelash. Nine in 10 gamely stepped up to a scanner....
'Sure, I'd be happy to do it,' said [a passenger] .... 'Privacy to me isn't
nearly as important as our security, especially if they assure me the X-
rays aren't harmful.'- 258 SmartCheck may well be an important layer of
aviation security today or in the near future, but it amplifies a core prob-
lem with current aviation security policy and how citizens are informed
about it, if at all.
It should not be underestimated that bad people are more dangerous
than bad things in the current global aviation marketplace.259 Correla-
tively, the search for bad objects should not be over-estimated at the
expense of inspecting airline passengers who may pose a threat to civil
aviation.26° Americans wary of an erosion of their privacy rights con-
tend "protections" like CAPPS, CAPPS I, Secure Flight, and the Regis-
tered Traveler program represent an Orwellian society realized, the
equivalent of "calling on 'Big Brother' to protect citizens from 'Big
Brother. ' ' 26 1  It is true that such security devices may challenge
existing civil liberties. But it is also true that lawful, constitutionally
sanctioned surveillance is nothing new in American society.262 Airline
257. Faye Bowers, With Full-Body X-ray, a Closer Look at Air Travelers, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 26, 2007, at 2.
258. Id.; Crandall, supra note 14, at 19 ("You want to travel on the airline system? You give
up your privacy. You don't want to give it up? Don't fly. Your privacy isn't equal to the safety
of the rest of us.").
259. Not only are security officials suspicious of passengers, but passengers are wary of
security officials and processes. "[M]ore travelers see US government officials as a reason not to
visit (70%) compared to the threat of terrorism or crime (54%). Furthermore, two thirds of
travelers fear that they will be detained for a simple misstatement and more than half believe that
US entry officials are rude." Officials a Bigger Threat Than Terrorists to US Tourism,
NEws@PATA, May 2, 2007, http://www.pata.org/patasite/index.php?id=1684#1.
260. See, e.g., Airport Screeners Missed Explosives, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007,
at A24 (discussing the success of government investigators in learning on the internet how to
make an improvised incendiary device with $150 in street-purchased parts, and smuggling liquid,
explosives and detonators through airport checkpoints); Nicole Gaouette, Airport Security Fixes
Debated, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, at 20 (reporting the call by federal investigators for more
physical searches of passengers to reduce the chances that a terrorist can sneak a bomb onto a
commercial airplane).
261. Alan F. Westin, Privacy in the Workplace: How Well Does American Law Reflect
American Values?, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 271, 273 (1996).
262. See LYON, supra note 180, at 4 ("It must be emphasized that while the events of 9/11 and
their aftermath were unprecedented, the idea that 'everything changed' on that day is highly
misleading .... In other words, the establishment of 'surveillance societies' that affect the lives of
all ordinary people was already well under way long before 9/11 ."); see also CHRISTIAN PARENTI,
THE SoFr CAGE: SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 199-200 (2003) ("Ultimately, 9/11 did not create a
technical or legal rupture in the development of everyday superintendence. It did, however,
radically accelerate momentum towards the soft cage of a surveillance society, just as it gave the
culture of fear a rejuvenating jolt."). See generally SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING (David
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passenger profiling represents a necessary policy decision to ensure lib-
erty through security. The central theory underlying modern profiling
systems is that September 11 could have been prevented or at least con-
tested. This article accepts that theory as fact and views as necessary
efforts to lawfully screen airline passengers more thoroughly than had
been done until September 11.
Lyon ed., 2003) (discussing the evolution of technology, surveillance, and social change through a
collection of essays and articles).
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